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Statement of Appellate Jurisdiction
Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-103(2)(j) provides that "The Court of
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over . . . cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court." By
Orders of February 20 and March 7, 2008, the Utah Supreme Court transferred
these matters to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. By Order of April 4,
2008, this Court granted and consolidated Appellant's two petitions for permission
to appeal the trial court's two interlocutory orders of partial summary judgment
against his Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) and Locomotive Inspection
Act (LIA) injury claims based on a defective locomotive dynamic brake and a low
locomotive cab ceiling height.
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review
First Issue: Dynamic Brake Defect Claim
Does the FELA's causation standard, that a railroad is liable if an
employee's injury results "in whole or in part" from the railroad's negligence or
violation of a statutory safety standard, require that a jury determine whether the
brake defect in Utah Railway Co.'s lead locomotive caused Mr, Raab to become
injured in another locomotive while replacing the lead locomotive?
Standard of Review
This Court reviews the trial court's determination and application of the
legal causation standard on summary judgment for legal correctness. The appellate
court does not defer to the trial court's conclusion that facts are undisputed, or to its
legal conclusions supported by those facts. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding,
1

909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996),
appeal after remand, 2001 UT 107,37P.3d 1130 (Utah 2001).
In FELA cases, where a jury determination is part and parcel of the remedy
the FELA affords to injured railroad workers, summary judgment is more strictly
limited than in ordinary civil cases. It is to be denied if a fair-minded juror could
honestly decide that the railroad's fault played uany part" in the employee's injury.
Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266,
1269, 1270 (2006); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 510, 77 S.Ct.
443(1957).
Congress desired to "secure jury determinations in a larger proportion of
cases than would be true of ordinary common law actions."
Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 1969).

Boeing Co. v.

"It follows that a trial judge must

submit an FELA case to the jury when there is even slight evidence of negligence."
Harbin v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 130 (7th Cir. 1990),
citing a number of FELA decisions reversing summary judgments on evidence
".. .scarcely more substantial than pigeon bone broth." Id. at 132.
Issue Raised in Trial Court
Utah Railway raised this issue in its motion for summary judgment on Mr.
Raab's defective brake claim (R. at 334-338; 339-425). Mr. Raab and Utah
Railway briefed and argued the issue (R. at 339-425; 452-496; 557-576; 932:1-8;
932:15-30; 932:54-59 and the trial court entered an order granting Utah Railway's
motion for partial summary judgment. (R. at 932:60-61). Mr. Raab specifically
presented to the trial court at oral argument the holdings and controlling effect of
2

Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S. Ct 443 (1957), Wilson v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co, 56 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), and Christiansen v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266 (2006), discussed
below. (R. at 932:16-24).
Second and Third Issues: Low Locomotive Cab Ceiling Height Claim
Did the trial court incorrectly hold a piece of air-conditioning equipment,
regardless of its dangerous placement, must malfunction in order to constitute an
actionable defect under the Locomotive Inspection Act?
Did the trial court impermissibly engage in fact finding and violate Mr.
Raab's right to a jury determination under the FELA on whether the low ceiling
was a cause, in whole or in part, of his injury?
Standard of Review
This Court reviews the trial court's determination and application of the
legal standard of what constitutes evidence of causation, and of legal violation, on
summary judgment for legal correctness. The appellate court does not defer to the
trial court's conclusion that facts are undisputed, or to its legal conclusions
supported by those facts. See Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,
1289 (Utah App. 1996), cert denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996), appeal after
remand, 2001 UT 107, 37 P.3d 1130 (Utah 2001), Review affords no deference to
the trial court's determination or conclusions of law. Transamerica Cash Reserve,
Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). This Court views
the facts, including all inferences arising from those facts, in a light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion and will allow summary judgment to stand only if
3

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.
Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 288-89 (Utah App. 1994).
In FELA cases, where a jury determination is part and parcel of the remedy
the FELA affords to injured railroad workers, summary judgment is more strictly
limited than in ordinary civil cases. It is to be denied if a fair-minded juror could
honestly decide that the railroad's fault played "any part" in the employee's injury.
Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266,
1269, 1270 (2006); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 510, 77 S.Ct.
443 (1957).
Issues Raised in Trial Court
Utah Railway raised this issue in its motion for summary judgment on Mr.
Raab's defective low ceiling claim, (R. at 651-653); Mr. Raab and Utah Railway
briefed and argued the issue, ((R. at 654-748; 795-854; 863-898; 932:8-15; 9323054); and the trial court entered an order granting Utah Railway's motion for partial
summary judgment. (R. at 905-908). Mr. Raab specifically presented to the trial
court at oral argument the holdings and controlling effect of Lilly v. Grand Trunk
Western R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 63 S. Ct. 347 (1943) and other cases on the legal
standards constituting an LIA violation, (R. at 932:32-38), Mr. Raab specifically
presented to the trial court at oral argument the holdings and controlling effect of
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S. Ct. 443 (1957), Wilson v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 56 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), and Christiansen v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266 (2006) on the issue of
causation. (R. at 932:16-24).
4

The trial court, on its own and not at the request of either party, also held as
a matter of law that Mr. Raab's was responsible for contributory negligence. Mr.
Raab argued extensively in the previous summary judgment motion that the FELA
requires causation issues to be detemiined by a jury. He did not specifically argue
his low ceiling height claim was not barred or affected as a matter of law by his
own contributory negligence because the court raised the issue on its own after
taking the matter under advisement.
Determinative Statutes
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51:
Liability of common carriers by railroad, in interstate or
foreign commerce, for injuries to employees from negligence;
employee defined
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce
between any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the
States and Territories . . . shall be liable in damages to any person
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part
from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed,
works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such
employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce;
or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such
commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be
considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and
shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter.
Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53:
Contributory negligence; diminution of damages
In all actions on and after April 22, 1908 brought against any
such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the
5

provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to
an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the
fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to such employee: Provided, That no such employee who
may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of
contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such
common earner of any statute enacted for the safety of employees
contributed to the injury or death of such employee.
Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701:
Requirements for use
A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive or
tender on its railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and its
parts and appurtenances (a)
are in proper condition and safe to operate without
unnecessary danger of personal injury;
(b) have been inspected as required under this chapter and
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation under this
chapter; and
(c)
can withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary
under this chapter.
Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case

This is an action for personal injuries brought by a railroad employee against
his railroad employer pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §
51 (FELA) and an associated safety statute, the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49
U.S.C. § 20701 (LIA).

Plaintiff Raab claims the railroad is responsible for his

injuries resulting from the presence of a defective dynamic brake in one
locomotive, and an abnormally low cab ceiling, created by the installation of an
overhead air conditioner, in another.
6

Mr. Raab sued the railroad on theories of strict liability under the LIA, and
negligence under the FELA. The railroad denied Mr. Raab's claims and alleged
contributory negligence as an affirmative defense.
2.

Course of Proceedings

The railroad filed motions for partial summary judgment, addressed at all of
Mr. Raab's claims except for negligence concerning the locomotive ceiling height.
The first motion sought judgment on all of Mr. Raab's claims arising from the
defective dynamic brake, on the premise that the brake could not, under the FELA
causation standard, be a legal cause in whole or in part of plaintiff s injuries. The
second motion sought judgment on Mr. Raab's claims for strict liability under the
LIA with respect to the low ceiling. The railroad contended that the position of the
air conditioning unit which constituted the low ceiling in the locomotive cab was
not an actionable defect under the LIA as a matter of law.
3.

Disposition in the Trial Court

The trial court granted both of Utah Railway's motions.

In addition,

although Utah Railway did not seek it in its motion, the trial court ruled in its
Minute Order of February 11, 2008, that "this is a case of non-attention incident to
operation and therefore appropriate for summary judgment denying liability under
FLIA . . . ." The trial court thus held, as a matter of law, that Mr. Raab was
contributorily negligent for hitting his head on the low locomotive ceiling to an
extent that barred his recovery.

7

4.

Statement of Relevant Facts

Utah Railway Co. is a coiporation authorized to transact business within the
state of Utah and is engaged in the business of an interstate common carrier by
railroad. Mr. Raab works for Utah Railway as a conductor. At all material times
both parties were engaged in interstate commerce or activity substantially or
materially affecting interstate commerce, (R. at 1 -4, % 2; 8-12, ^ 2; 341: ^ 1, 2, 3).
On the evening of May 31, 2002, Mr. Raab was working as the conductor on
a Utah Railway coal train approaching Soldier Summit, from which it would
descend through Provo Canyon. Mr. Raab and his engineer discovered that the
dynamic brake on the train's lead locomotive did not work, which meant the train
would go too fast while descending through the canyon. (R. at 341-42: ^ 3, 4, 5).
The dynamic brake uses the electric motors to slow the locomotive. An air
brake applies against the wheels of every car and locomotive in the train. It is
common to use both the dynamic and air brakes in order to safely control speed in
mountainous territories. (R. at 341-42: f 4, 5, FN. 3).
After reaching the summit Mr. Raab and his engineer dealt with the safety
problem by removing and replacing the lead locomotive in the train with another
locomotive equipped with a properly functioning dynamic brake. They then had to
shuffle and reconnect four trailing locomotives as part of the replacement. This
created a rebuilt front locomotive array, known as a front consist. In this way they
would adequately control descending speed and get the train moving again. (R. at
342: ^[5; 453).

8

During the rebuilding of the front consist, Mr. Raab entered the cabs of the
various trailing locomotives. While working for these purposes in a dark trailing
locomotive, Mr. Raab, who is 6 foot 4 inches tall in his work boots, struck the top
of his head on an air conditioning unit installed into and forming a portion of an
abnormally low locomotive cab ceiling. This occurred when he entered the cab
through its 5 foot 6 inch entry door and then stood erect, driving the top of his head
into the 5 foot 10-11 inch ceiling. The force was severe enough to cause several of
Mr. Raab's cervical discs to herniate. (R. at 342-43 ^ 5, 6, 7, 8. R. at 453. R. at
376, Interrogatory No. 1. R. at 367-68, fl[4 Allan Tencer). R. at 659, ^12. R. at
714-16 ffifl-8 (Scott Tucker Affidavit).)
Summary of Arguments
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on Mr. Raab's defective brake
claim is manifest error. It ignored established Utah law that causation is almost
always a fact issue in ordinary tort cases. It also ignored the Utah Court of
Appeals' recent description of the even more relaxed FELA causation standard in
Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co,, 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266
(2006), as well as a long line of controlling FELA causation decisions by federal
courts of appeal and the United States Supreme Court.
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on Mr. Raab's LIA low ceiling
claim is also manifest error.

It ignored established federal law that neither a

mechanical defect of the particular locomotive part involved, nor a violation of a
specific Federal Railroad Administration regulation, is necessary to invoke liability
under the LIA.

It ignored longstanding federal law holding that evidence
9

demonstrating that any circumstance which renders the locomotive unsafe to
operate without unnecessary danger to the crew creates a violation of LIA. And in
holding Mr. Raab responsible for contributory negligence as a matter of law, it
ignored a long line of controlling FELA causation decisions by federal courts of
appeal and the United States Supreme Court, as well as this Court's recent
description of the FELA causation standard in Christiansen v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266 (2006).
Argument
1.
The FELA's causation standard requires that a jury determine
whether the brake defect in Utah Railway Co. 's lead locomotive caused Mr. Raab
to become injured in another locomotive while replacing the lead locomotive.
The FELA, at 45 U.S.C. § 51, provides that a railroad is liable to its
employee for injury "resulting in whole or in part" from the railroad's negligence
or violation of an attendant federal safety statute. One such safety statute is the
Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 etseq.
Utah Railway Co. argued, and the trial court agreed, that the lead
locomotive's brake defect could not be a cause of Mr. Raab's injury as a matter of
law because Mr. Raab had decoupled that locomotive, set it aside, and was finished
with it. Because it was not part of the consist Mr. Raab was rebuilding when he
injured his head and neck in one of the trailing locomotives, the trial court held,
'There's no connection." (R. at 932:62).
This legal conclusion is manifestly contrary to Utah's rule that "Generally,
causation cannot be resolved as a matter of law. Proximate cause is an issue of
fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer
10

causation, is summary judgment appropriate."

Kilpatrick v. Riley, Wein &

Fielding, supra, 909 P.2d at 1292 (citations omitted) (reversing entry of summary
judgment on causation). "In other words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of
the elements of causation on summary judgment." Id.
Utah also holds that "Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any
cause of action. In Utah, c[p]roximate causation is [t]hat cause which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.'" Id.
Such a natural and continuous sequence occurred here. A defective brake
required Mr. Raab to decide to take the lead locomotive out of service before
making a descent through the mountains. That required him to replace the lead
locomotive with a new one. That required him to rebuild the front consist. That
required him to enter the trailing locomotives to operate and set the controls. That
caused him to suffer a serious neck injury. This sequence, which started with the
brake defect and was unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, caused Mr.
Raab's injury.

If the lead locomotive brake had not been defective, Mr. Raab

would not have had to rebuild the front consist, would not have had to enter the
dark cab of a trailing locomotive, and would not have been injured as he was.
Utah Railway's own answer to Mr. Raab's petition for permission to appeal
the interlocutory order of the trial court states the natural and probable consequence
of Mr. Raab's injury resulting from the brake defect in locomotive unit 5006. "The
5006 unit was removed from the consist because the engineer thought it had a
problem with its dynamic brakes."

Answer in Opposition pp. 2-3,
11

As a

consequence of the defect, after removing unit 5006 from service and while
remaking the front consist, "Mr. Raab was performing his expected duties of going
into the trailing locomotive units of the consist of locomotives that had been
coupled together at the head end, in order the make sure the controls were properly
positioned. This was necessary to enable the engineer to control those locomotives
from the cab of the leading unit. It was while Mr. Raab was performing this task"
that he hit his head. Answer in Opposition p. 3.
The assessment of the chain of causation which produced Mr. Raab's injury
is a fact issue for the jury. "To establish causation, plaintiffs must persuade a fact
finder that their injury was a natural result of the defendant's breach. Plaintiffs
therefore must spin together myriad facts into a durable thread that reasonably
connects defendant's breach to plaintiffs injury." Id. These issues "do not lend
themselves to a determination on summary judgment." Id.
The trial court's error in granting summary judgment on causation for
plaintiffs defective brake claim is even greater in the context of an FELA case.
Under the FELA, "the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with
reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.'"
Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266,
1270 (2006), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.
Ct, 443, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1957) (emphasis added).
Rogers is the leading case regarding causation under the FELA and,
therefore, under the Locomotive Inspection Act. There, the United States Supreme
12

Court set forth the standard, unchanged for more than 50 years, of what facts are
sufficient to constitute a jury question. In that case, a railroad employee was
assigned to burn weeds and vegetation along defendant's track. He was given a
flame thrower and had begun burning the weeds on the day in question. Hearing
an oncoming train, he stepped back from the tracks and stood near a culvert. The
passing train fanned the flames on the burning weeds causing the fire to move
toward him. In attempting to escape harm he fell from the top of the culvert and
sustained serious injuries. 352 U.S. at 501-502. The railroad appealed a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff and the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the decision,
concluding that the facts did not support liability. 352 U.S. at 501.
The plaintiff had claimed liability based on his being required to work in
close proximity to moving trains and on ground conditions that were not safe. 352
U.S. at 502-503.

The Missouri Supreme Court's reversal was based on its

conclusion that it was his inattention which caused the fire to spread and that this
was "something extraordinary, unrelated to and disconnected from" the ground
conditions. 357 U.S. at 504. Just as Utah Railway advocates here, the Missouri
Supreme Court found as a matter of law, that the ground conditions merely created
an incidental situation, and that plaintiffs conduct was the sole cause of his
injuries.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and found that the evidence was sufficient
to support the jury's verdict. 352 U.S. at 503, The Court held: "Under this statute
the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the
conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in
13

producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Id. at 507 (emphasis
in original). The Court continued, "It does not matter that, from the evidence, the
jury may also with reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result to other
causes, including the employee's contributory negligence." Id. " Judicial appraisal
of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited
to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that
negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death." Id.
"Judges are to fix their sights primarily to make that appraisal and, if that test is
met, are bound to find that a case for the jury is made out whether or not the
evidence allows the jury a choice of other probabilities." Id.
Rogers ruled as it did because Congress, in 1939 amendments to the FELA,
specifically intended "to leave to the fact-finding function of the jury the decision
of the primary question raised in these cases - whether employer fault played any
part in the employee's mishap." Id. at 509, 77 S. Ct. at 450. The lower court's
opinion, which took the causation issue away from the jury, was a "misconception"
which "fails to take into account the special features of this statutory negligence
action that make it significantly different from the ordinary common-law
negligence." Id.
This persistent misconception "has required this Court to review a number of
cases. In a relatively large percentage of the cases reviewed, the Court has found
that lower courts have not given proper scope to this integral part of the
congressional scheme." Id. at 510, 77 S. Ct. at 450. The Supreme Court then cited
18 of its opinions which reversed FELA decisions because of the presence of a jury
14

question. Id. at 510 n. 26, 77 S. Ct. at 451 n. 26.
Even before Rogers, in Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S.
Ct. 275 (1949), the Supreme Court reversed an FELA directed verdict in Utah state
court.

The plaintiff, who was not watchful, ran into a locomotive which had

suddenly stopped because of bad brakes. In words directly applicable here, the
Supreme Court held that FELA and safety act liability "follows from the unlawful
use of prohibited defective equipment 'not from the position the employee may be
in, or the work which he may be doing at the moment when he is injured."' Id. at
523, 69 S.Ct. at 276-77.
Regarding causation, the Coray Court held, "The language selected by
Congress to fix liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct Consideration of
its meaning by the introduction of dialectical subtleties can serve no useful
interpretive purpose."

Id, at 524, 69 S. Ct. at 277.

The Court concluded,

"Congress has thus for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety obligations
upon railroads and has commanded that if a breach of these obligations contributes
in part to an employee's death, the railroad must pay damages." Id., 69 S. Ct. at
277.
Following Rogers, this Court recognizes that "'[a] plaintiffs burden in a
FELA action . . . is significantly lighter than it would be in an ordinary negligence
case." Christiansen, supra, 136 P.3d at 1270 (2006), quoting Williams v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 161 F.3d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1998). This is "because a jury
determination *is part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers" by the
statute. Christiansen, supra, 136 P.3d at 1270. "Under the FELA, where liability
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depends largely on the unique circumstances of each case, 'Congress vested the
power of decision in these actions exclusively in the jury in all but the infrequent
case where fair-minded jurors cannot honestly differ whether fault of the employer
played any part in the employee's injury." Id; quoting Rogers, supra, 352 U.S. at
510 (emphasis added).
Indeed, responding to a defendant railroad's characterization that the claim
against it "contains less substance than broth brewed from the bones of a starved
pigeon," the Seventh Circuit has noted that "numerous FELA actions have been
submitted to a jury based upon . . . evidence scarcely more substantial than pigeon
bone broth." Harbin v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131, 132
(7th Cir. 1990).
Many federal and state court decisions have consistently implemented these
principles over the decades since Congress enacted the FELA in 1908. Mr. Raab
sets forth two pertinent illustrations here.
In Chicago Great Western Railroad Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287, 45 S. Ct.
303 (1925), the Supreme Court affirmed a verdict for the estate of a dead brakeman
over the railroad's contention of insufficient evidence on causation. A drawbar
pulled out of a train car. The crew chained the car to the preceding car and pulled
the entire train onto a siding in order to shuffle the train, leave the defective car
behind, and resume the trip.

During the shuffling the brakeman died in an

accident. The Supreme Court held the use of the defective car had not ended at the
time of the accident. "To cut this car out of the train so the latter might proceed to
destination was the thing in view, an essential part of the undertaking in connection
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with which the injuries arose." Id. at 291-92, 45 S. Ct. at 304. The brakeman
"went into the dangerous place because the equipment of the car it was necessary
to detach did not meet the statutory requirements especially intended to protect
men in his position." Id at 292, 45 S. Ct. at 305.
In Wilson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 56 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), a
brakeman walked back to the head of a train after he had successfully disabled
defectively locked brakes on a car 20 cars back. He did this so the train could
continue its trip. On the way back from accomplishing his task he stepped into a
road rut and injured his ankle. The brakeman claimed the brake defect violated the
Safety Appliance Act, and the violation was a cause of his injury in whole or in
part under the FELA. The 10th Circuit affirmed denial of the railroad's motion for
summary judgment on causation, holding "It is undisputed that Mr. Wilson was
injured while returning from attending to an SAA violation. But for the violation,
Mr. Wilson would not have been forced to walk on the dark, rutted road where the
injury occurred." Id. at 1230. The court held, "In this case, where there is no
suggestion that Mr. Wilson had returned from the repair site or had begin duties
unrelated to the SAA violation, we find no error in the district court's denial of
Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment." Id.
Here, Mr. Raab was still engaged in duties relating to the replacement of the
defective locomotive when he became injured.

His work rebuilding the front

consist was work at the site of the problem, and placed him squarely within the
ambit of the defective brake's consequences under the FELA causation standard as
defined by Schendel and Wilson. Causation here is an issue of fact for the jury.
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2.
In ruling on Mr. Raab 's low ceiling height claim, the trial court
incorrectly held a piece of air-conditioning equipment, regardless of its dangerous
placement, must malfunction in order to constitute an actionable defect under the
Locomotive Inspection Act.
The FELA, at 45 U.S.C. § 51, provides that a railroad is liable to its
employee for injury "resulting in whole or in part" from the railroad's violation of
an attendant federal safety statute. One such safety statute is the Locomotive
Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq. The LIA makes it unlawful for a railroad
to use a locomotive on its line unless it is "...in proper condition and safe to
operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury" (49 U.S.C. § 20701(1)) or
unless it "can withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary under this chapter."
(49 U.S.C. §20701(3)).
Utah Railway argued, and the trial court erroneously agreed, that the
defective placement of the air conditioner as part of the locomotive's low ceiling
was not a violation of the LIA as a matter of law because, regardless of its
placement and any hazard that placement might present, it was otherwise
functioning properly as an air conditioner. In its Order, the trial court found "There
is no evidence that the air conditioner in the subject locomotive was
malfunctioning, defective or broken as the time the plaintiff bumped into it" (sic),
and that plaintiff ".. .does need to show that his injury was a proximate result of the
failure of the part in question (AC Unit) to perform properly. In this particular
case, the plaintiff alleges that the AC Unit was hung too low, reducing the head
clearance. There is no allegation that there was a defect in the functioning of the
unit." Order, paragraphs 4-5, page 2.
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Relevant to this case, a carrier may violate the L1A by failing to keep the
locomotive and all parts and appurtenances in proper condition and safe to operate
without unnecessary peril to life or limb, or by failing to comply with regulations
issued by the Federal Railroad Administration. Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R.
Co , 317 U.S. 481, 63 S.Ct. 347 (1943); Mosco v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 817 F.2d
1088, 1091 (4th Cir. 1987).
The LIA is to be liberally construed in the light of its prime purpose, the
protection of employees, by requiring the use of safe equipment. 49 U.S.C. 20701.
The Act covers not only defects in construction or mechanical operation, but gives
protection against any condition which renders the locomotive unsafe, including
the presence of dangerous objects or foreign matter. Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western
R. Co, supra. In sustaining a jury verdict for plaintiff the Lilly Court held: "The
use of a tender, upon whose top an employee must go in the course of his duties,
which is covered with ice seems to us to involve 'unnecessary peril to life or limb'enough so as to permit a jury to find that the Boiler Inspection Act [now the LIA]
has been violated." 317 U.S. 481, 486, 63 S.Ct. 347, 351.
Many cases since Lilly have made it clear that imposition of absolute
liability under the LIA does not depend upon the presence of a mechanical defect
or functional failure of a component. Two relevant examples are Calabritto v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 287 F.2d 394 (2nd Cir. 1961) (presence of sand and oil on
locomotive platform a violation of the LIA, without any mechanical defect with the
platfonn itself or specific FRA regulation); and Delevie v. Reading Co., 176 F.2d
496, 497 (3 ,d Cir. 1949) (power reverse gear mechanism installed horizontally
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above footwalk made access to cab unsafe; location of that mechanism was a cause
of the accident).
Delevie is substantially similar to the case at bar. In Delevie, plaintiffs
husband was mounting a stationary engine. He fell, suffered severe injuries, and
eventually died. After a trial, the jury, in answer to a specific interrogatory, found
that there was no foreign substance on the steps, footwalk, or running board,
(wiiich were progressively the means of entry to the engine cab), in sufficient
quantity to make the path to the engine cab unsafe at that time. The jury also
found, however, that a power reverse gear mechanism installed horizontally above
the metal footwalk made access to the cab unsafe, and that the location of that
mechanism was a cause of the accident. The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment
for the plaintiff. Id. at 497. Accord: Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Botts,
173 F.2d 164, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1949); Bolan v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 167 F.2d 934,
936(2 nd Cir. 1948).
In attempting to justify its decision, the trial court's Order also erroneously
concluded that the LIA can only be implicated when a specific FRA regulation is
violated. That is not the law.
A railroad can violate the general safety clause of the Locomotive Inspection
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701(1), without violating a specific safety regulation. "[E]ven
if a earner complies with the regulations, it may still violate the Act if the parts or
appurtenances of its locomotives are otherwise unsafe." Mosco v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad, 817 F.2d 1088, 1091 (4th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 851,
108 S. Ct. 152(1987).
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Delevie v. Reading Co., 176 F.2d 496 (3rd Cir. 1949), is again instructive.
On appeal of a verdict for plaintiff, the railroad argued that the jury should not have
been permitted to consider the location of the reverse gear mechanism as a basis for
liability. According to that defendant, (1) the Interstate Commerce Commission
[now FRA] required the mechanism; (2) as installed in 1941, the gear still left the
10~inch footwalk clearance required by I.C.C. regulations of long standing; and (3)
the location of the mechanism was selected by qualified personnel of defendant and
had passed Interstate Commerce Commission inspections. Id. at 497.
In response, the Third Circuit held, "The Interstate Commerce Commission
does not purport to issue a set of regulations so complete and comprehensive that a
railroad company need only obey its instructions."

Id.

at 497.

The court

explained, "Defendant had to install a reverse gear mechanism, and had to provide
a footwalk at least 10 inches in width; but defendant was not promised immunity
from liability" merely "by placing the mechanism in a spot where a footwalk,
otherwise 27 inches in width, still protruded about 10 inches beyond the
mechanism. . . . and the physical set-up which resulted was one which the jury
found to be unsafe. . . . " Id. "In other words," the Third Circuit held in terms
directly applicable here, "a locomotive, no single part of which is installed or
maintained in violation of the Boiler Inspection Act, may still provide an unsafe
place to work and so violate the Act." Id.
In Bolan v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 167 F.2d 934, 936 (2nd Cir. 1948), and
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Botts, 173 F.2d 164, 167-168 (8th Cir. 1949), both
plaintiffs were injured when they fell from locomotive footboards. In both cases,
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the defendant railroads contended that their compliance with an FRA regulation
about such footboards condemned the plaintiffs LI A case to failure. In response,
the Bolan court held, "We think such compliance, however, did not relieve
appellant of its duty under the Boiler Inspection Act to maintain" all
"appurtenances of its engine (of which the pilot step is one) 'in proper condition
and safe to operate * * * that the same may be employed in the active service of
such earner without unnecessary peril to life or limb."' Id, at 936. According to
the court, "The Commission's regulation . . . merely provides for the number,
dimensions, location and manner of application of such steps. A step may comply
with these directions and yet be in a highly dangerous condition because it is worn
or bent. . . ." Id. The court concluded, "The statute is to be construed in the light
of its humanitarian objectives. Accordingly, if an appurtenance conforms with the
I.C.C. regulations but nevertheless violates the Act, the latter must control." Id.
Likewise, in Botts, the court held:
The language of the Act affords no basis for the argument
which appellant makes. It is to be noted that section 2, 45 U.S.C.A. §
23, (now recodified at 49 USC 20701), provides that a earner may not
use a locomotive, 'unless' it and all its parts are in proper condition
and safe to operate, without unnecessary peril to life or limb, in the
service to which the locomotive is put, ' and unless' it has been
subjected to the inspections provided for in the Act, ' and" it meets
such tests 'as may be prescribed' in the rules in regulations of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. (Italics ours.) The effect of this is
to impose three conditions on a earner's right to use a locomotive. . . .
These on their face are coordinate conditions and commands,
and the clauses therefore are not simply coincident. . .,
Botts, supra, 173 F.2d at 167-8.
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3,
The trial court impermissibly engaged in fact finding and violated Mr.
Raab's right to a jury determination under the FELA on whether the low ceiling
was a cause, in whole or in part, of his injury
Even though Utah Railway Co. did not argue for the premise, the trial court
also ruled as a matter of law that the low ceiling condition could not be a cause of
Mr. Raab's injury because it found his failure to see and avoid the low ceiling was
the sole cause of his injury, saying, "The undisputed facts in this case establish that
this is a case of non-attention incident to operation and therefore appropriate for
summary judgment denying liability under FLIA." Exhibit 1, February 11, 2008
Order, paragraph 8, page 3.
However, under ordinary Utah law, "Generally, causation cannot be resolved
as a matter of law. Proximate cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment
appropriate."

Kilpatrick v. Riley, Wein & Fielding, supra, 909 P.2d at 1292

(citations omitted) (reversing entry of summary judgment on causation). "In other
words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the elements of causation on
summary judgment." Id.
Utah also holds that "Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any
cause of action. In Utah, 4[p]roximate causation is [tjhat cause which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.'" Id.
The trial court's error in granting summary judgment on causation against
plaintiffs defective low ceiling claim is even greater in the context of an FELA
case. Under the FELA, "the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify
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with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.'"
Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266,
1270 (2006), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.
Ct. 443, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1957) (emphasis added).
Instead of following Lilly and Delevie, however, the trial court held the state
case ofEhalt v. McCarthy, 138 P.2d 646 (Utah 1943) controlled as a matter of law.
But Ehart was a case where no defect with the locomotive was alleged or proven.
There, plaintiff was driving a steam locomotive, and failed to check the water level
sight glass. Solely because of that neglect, he and his co-worker ran the steam
engine out of water, causing it to overheat and explode. Ehart's own proof in the
case was that there was nothing unsafe about the steam locomotive, except that it
will overheat if its water is not replenished. The Utah Supreme Court held this was
a case where Ehart's conduct was the sole cause of the explosion.
Here, on summary judgment, in order to reach the result it did, the trial court
would necessarily have had to engage in fact finding, discounting Raab's
allegations of an abnormally low ceiling created by the AC Unit placement, and
instead finding that his conduct alone in not seeing and avoiding the low ceiling
was the sole cause of his injuries.

Factual determinations of this nature are

impermissible under the FELA/LIA scheme. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653,
66S.Q. 740, 744(1946).
Causation here is an issue of fact for the jury.
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Conclusion
Mr. Raab requests this Court to reverse the trial court's rulings granting
summary judgment to Utah Railway, to remand the matter to the trial court
reinstating Mr. Raab's claims under the LI A and FELA as consistent with this
brief, and to award Mr. Raab his costs incurred in prosecuting this appeal.
Dated this 3rd day of September, 2008.
KIRKLIN FOLAWN LLP
CARR & WAJEpSoUPS

&hen C Thj/mpson (Pro HacYice)
Trent J. Waddoups, Bar No. 7657
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Scott Raab
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - DECEMBER 11, 2007
JUDGE L. A. DEVER PRESIDING
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification
may not be accurate with audio recordings)
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

This is the matter of Raab vs. Utah Railway Company,
050908773.

If you would like to enter your appearances for

the record.
MR. THOMPSON:

Good morning Your Honor, Stephen

Thompson with Kirklin Folawn for plaintiff, Scott Raab.
MR. MCGARVEY:

And Casey McGarvey and Susan Barrett

with me from Berman & Savage for the defendant, Utah Railway.
THE COURT:

This is on for various motions,

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's Motion
to Compel, etc.

So I guess we should proceed with the Motion

for Summary Judgment.
Mr. McGarvey, if you would like to proceed.
MR. MCGARVEY:

Thank you very much, Your Honor.

One of the issues for summary judgment, as you know from
reading your material and I know that you do that, pertains
to the dynamic brake which is directly related to the
discovery motions as well, so I think it is wise that we
address that particular issue first and let me talk about
that.

I believe it's clear but just to make sure, the
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1 \ context of what I'm about to say this morning, just want to
2 j make sure that it's clear that we understand the plaintiff in
3 ; this case, Mr. Raab, is a conductor for the railroad.

What

4 I that means is that he's responsible for the trains that he
5

operates on.

There are two members of the crews, typically

6

the conductor and the engineer and this particular evening of

7 j May 31, 2002 the engineer was Mr. Booth.

As the conductor

8 : and being responsible for the train, it would be Mr. Raab's
9 i responsibility to check the train out and make sure it was in
10 j proper condition to move and to be operated.

The engineer

11

then would move it.

If there was a problem with the train

12

the conductor would go back and take care of it.

Sometimes

13 I trains break"in two with couplers that malfunction.
i

It would

14 i be his responsibility then to check that out and to do that.
15 J Part of his responsibilities includes not only riding in
16 I locomotive cabs but going through and being in locomotive
17 j cabs to perform his regular, ordinary duties as a conductor.
18

With that understanding, the position with respect

19 j to the allegation that a defective dynamic brake caused his
20 j injury on this particular injury cannot stand because there's
21 j no causation.

It's too far removed.

It cannot be said that

22

before the fact that there was a dynamic brake failure,

23

assuming that there was, on a 5006 locomotive, that's the

24

designation of the particular unit, that Raab would not have

25 | bumped his head on the air conditioner.
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We could just easily

say that had Mr. Raab not been assigned to that particular
job but had another job, that particular job was to take a
coal train down from the summit into Provo, had he been
assigned to another job he would not have bumped his head.
He may have on a different locomotive but I mean, we can also
say that had he had a different assignment he would not have
been in that position and not had to do those particular
duties, wherein he was caused to go into a 6000 series
locomotive where he ended up bumping his head.

With the

brake failure, just like being assigned to that particular
job, Mr. Raab could have gone into the cab of the 6000 series
locomotive like others had before and after he did on that
night without bumping his head.

There's nothing unique about

the brake failure that caused him to bump his head.

The

brake failure set up circumstances where his job duties were
perhaps different than they would have been had there not
been a brake failure but his job duties still required him to
go inside locomotives and it didn't cause him to stand up too
soon and bump his head.
Likewise, without any brake failure, just like
being assigned to that particular job, Mr. Raab still could
have had occasion to go into a 6000 series locomotive like he
and others had prior to and after this particular incident
and then still could have stood up too soon after ducking
through the doorway and still have bumped his head, even if
3

12

1 I there had been no brake failure.
So, although there was an allegation here of a
brake failure which is being assumed for purposes of this
particular motion, that particular condition or problem or
defect or violation of the Locomotive Inspection Act or
negligence or whatever liability prong is relied upon, can't
be a cause of Mr. Raab's alleged injuries in being in a
completely differently locomotive doing duties he would have
to do of making sure the train was to operate where he just
happened to bump his head at that time but hadn't on any
other time.
There's nothing about the dynamic brake and the
5006 that changes the fact that if you don't stand up too
soon you won't bump you head or if you do stand up too soon,
you will bump your head.
chairs.

The same thing can be said of

There's chairs inside these locomotives.

have gone in and bumped his knee against a chair.
steps in these locomotives.
tripped.

He could
There are

He could have missed a step and

Just because on this particular occasion be stood

up too soon doesn't tie it to the fact that the dynamic brake
caused that to happen here.
So the law is that there must be a causation.

I

think even Raab admits in his papers that causation is
critical and Raab's arguments, I believe Your Honor, misses
the point of the railroad's motion or position on its motion

13

here and that is that Raab's point is that the causation
standard is something less than proximate cause.

I think

that that's really an immaterial point and doesn't address
the issue here and whether or not Raab is right on that
really depends on the definition of proximate cause.

If the

definition of proximate cause is as some states have held in
common law that the defendant's conduct must be the sole
cause as was the law in Missouri, the law that the Rogers
Court was considering, then he's correct.

The FELA doesn't

have, doesn't require that definition of proximate cause.

If

the definition is as in Utah, just simply substantial fact or
efficient cause, then clearly the FELA does require causation
and proximate cause under that standard and the Supreme Court
cases on numerous occasions talked about there need for being
proximate cause.
The thrust of the plaintiff's argument really,
although immaterial - just to make sure that we're clear boils down to if the defendant is one percent at fault then
the case proceeds and we agree with that, everyone is in
agreement.

Our point simply is is that there is no

causation, assuming that the brakes failed, that there was a
violation of a statute of negligence or whatever, there
cannot from that fault even be one percent proximate cause
just because it's too far removed.
So the particular discussion of Rogers and all of
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that really doesn't apply here but just want to make sure
that we're all clear on what Rogers really stands for is
simply that one percent then that' s sufficient to go to a
jury, one percent of negligence.

it's not something as many

courts had construed as Sorell in Kearns discussed and that
is some sort of concept of slight negligence.
Or slight causation.

What is that?

What is that?

Is that almost

negligence but not quite?
THE COURT:

Pardon me for interrupting you,

counsel, but is it your position that if I grant the Motion
for Summary Judgment and say that the dynamic brake issue on
5006 has no relevance to the injury here, that that ends the
case?
MR. MCGARVEY:

No, absolutely not. I do not.

I say

that ends the issue with respect to the dynamic brake.
THE COURT:

I mean, there's still an issue of

whether or not the railroad negligently installed an air
conditioning unit, isn't there?
MR. MCGARVEY:

Absolutely.

If I just said anything

to imply that we thought it ended the case then I misspoke
and did not intend that.

No, only as to the issue with

respect to the dynamic brake, Your Honor.

We still have an

issue in this case with respect to the air conditioner on
which Mr. Raab bumped his head and taking the dynamic brake
issue out of the case does not prohibit the plaintiff from

15

moving forward on that other theory.
THE COURT:

So what exactly are you asking me to do

here today?
MR. MCGARVEY:

I'm asking you here with respect to

the Motion for Summary Judgment on the dynamic brake, because
it is an express allegation and position of the plaintiff
that the railroad is liable because the dynamic brake failed
to rule as a matter of law that that cannot be a basis for
liability.

So for purposes of the motion, assuming it did

fail, as a matter of law Utah Railway cannot be held
responsible or liable to the plaintiff because of that
failure simply because there is no legal causation from that
brake.
The cases cited on causation cited by Raab, just to
touch on them briefly, Your Honor, Coreh involved a train
that had a defect in the brake and the train stopped on the
track.

The plaintiff in that case was injured directly

because the train stopped by running into that stopped train.
I submit that that is a much different case than the case
here.
Other cases cited by plaintiff are similar in that
there's a direct relationship between the injury and the
particular defect at issue and problem with the train.
is not the case here.

That

Mr. Raab didn't bump his head because

the brake failed and certainly could have bumped his head in
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going through that locoraotive or any locomotive or tripped or
hit. his knee or anything else despite a dynamic brake
failure.
So I think, you know, I don't want to restate it
again and again in different ways.

I think that you

understand the point on that particular motion that we have.
Unless you have any questions, I'd like to move to
the next one.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MCGARVEY:

The next Motion for Summary Judgment

does pertain to the air conditioner and just from the outset
let me also make sure it' s clear that this motion, if
granted, also would not do away with this case.
still be an issue in this case.

There would

The air conditioner is

alleged to be a basis for liability on two prongs.

One, it's

claimed to be a violation of the Locomotive Inspection Act;
and two, it's alleged to constitute negligence.
does not address the second prong, negligence.

Our motion
It only

addresses liability based upon a violation of the Locomotive
Inspection Act.

So by granting this particular motion, the

Court would be ruling that defendant cannot be liable because
of the existence of the air conditioner under the Locomotive
Inspection Act.

Rather, plaintiff's case would go forward

simply under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, Negligence
Provisions.
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THE COURT:

I'm sorry, counsel, but I have missed

something because the only memo that I have from you talks
about the dynamic brake.

I don't have anything that talks

about anything about an air conditioning unit.
MR. MCGARVEY:

I just have to then just absolutely

apologize to Your Honor.
THE COURT:

I have what I considered to be the

entire thing which said it was and everything.

I went

through all of that and there's not one thing in there about
an air conditioning unit.
MR. MCGARVEY:
THE COURT:

Yeah -

From either side.

MR. MCGARVEY:

Then I have to absolutely apologize,

it was my understanding that we had submitted all the briefs
on that motion and I just am so embarrassed, Your Honor, that
that did not happen.1
THE COURT:

If you did, I didn't get a copy.

Understand, gentlemen, I don't go through the files.
MR. MCGARVEY:
THE COURT:

Oh, I understand.

I look at the courtesy copies that are

sent to me and my clerk says this is everything I've got.
have looked and there's not one thing about an air
conditioner from either side.
MR. MCGARVEY:

I just feel terrible because I

thought that had happened last week, that all the briefs on
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both sides had been submitted and I know that the Court had
especially set this to address ail those so I am so sorry
that that occurred and it appears then that for our fault
that we're not in a position to talk about that.
What would you like us to do, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

Why don't you go ahead and talk about

it and then I will review the memos when I find them or get
them to make a decision on that issue.
everything about the other issues.

I mean, I've read

So why don't you just go

ahead and tell me what your position is and we'll hopefully
find something out from the memos when I get them.
MR. MCGARVEY:

Okay.

The second Motion for Summary

Judgment that pertains to the air conditioner simply was that
the railroad cannot be held liable for a violation of the
Locomotive Inspection Act.

The case would still go forward

on the basis of the air conditioner being a basis for
liability, it's existence being a basis for liability.
The Locomotive Inspection Act has three prongs to
it.

One pertains to inspections occurring in accordance with

that statute and regulations under it.

There really has been

no evidence or argument by the plaintiff that there have not
been inspections that have occurred in accordance with what
was required under the statute to regulations.
Another prong is that there can be a violation if
some test prescribed by the regulations, by the Federal
10
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Railroad Administration has not, the locomotive or parts do
not comply with some test that they prescribe.

There really

has not been any evidence or argument on that point.
The last prong is the general prong and that is
that locomotive and parts must be in proper condition and
safe to operate without unnecessary peril to life and limb
and it's under that general provision really that the
plaintiffs claim that the existence of the air conditioner is
a violation of that particular provision of the statute and
it's our position, Your Honor, that the air conditioner was
in proper condition.

It worked as an air conditioner. It

wasn't malfunctioning. It wasn't leaking fluid. It didn't
have any material, any snow or ice or any slippery material
or anything on it.

There was nothing about it that caused

Mr. Raab to bump his head on it.

The argument of the

plaintiff here is that its mere existence is a violation of
the statute and we've pointed out that there are no
regulations or standards that pertain to high clearance or
ceiling clearance or anything that would prohibit the
existence of an air conditioner and we cited in the briefing,
Your Honor, cases that talk about that there must be a
defect, some malfunction or something wrong with the part and
in this case there wasn't anything wrong, it just merely
existed and the plaintiff happened to hit his head against
it.

There were cases cited by the plaintiff and one I think
11
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1 I highlights the importance of this.

One of the cases they

cited had a reverse gear that a railroad worker had to
maneuver in order to get into a cab.

He didn't hit himself

on the reverse gear but that reverse gear inhibited his
ability to grab onto a grab iron in order to support himself
and because, as the Court found, it made it particular
difficult to grab onto the iron, they found that that could
be a basis for a violation of this particular act and we
submit, Your Honor, that the existence then of the reverse
gear in that case made sense because it created a dangerous
condition.
Here however, there's nothing about the air
conditioner that made it difficult for Mr. Raab to do
anything to protect his safety.

He had to duck even lower

than the air conditioner just simply to get through the cab
door.

There are other places in a cab that you would have to

duck if you were going to go.

Unfortunately locomotives are

limited in the space that they have.

The cabs are small and

he happened to hit his head on the air conditioner just like
he could have hit his knee on a chair or hit anything else
but that doesn't mean that the chair or the console or the
step is a defect or renders the locomotive, as the standard
says, not in proper condition and unsafe to operate without
unnecessary peril to life.

Unfortunately, there are dangers

associated with locomotives and congress has not seen fit to
12
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rule or to enter a statute that all injuries, no matter what,
are the responsibility of the railroad.

The statute rather

did, if there7 s negligence or if there is a violation of a
safety statute and the issue here is as a matter of law,
there cannot be liability under the basis of the violation of
this particular safety statute.
Also in the plaintiff's opposition they raise
subsequent remedial measures in that they point out that
although Mr. Raab was the first person who Utah Railway knew
of who had bumped their head on this locomotive, another
employee a year or over a year later also had bumped his head
and the railroad after that then took out the air
conditioners and we submit that that subsequent act can't be
a basis for liability and it certainly can't be a basis for
finding that the statute was applicable and was violated in
this particular case.
The Court should know that this series of
locomotives consisted of a group of locomotives, not just one
that had these air conditioners.

They came to Utah Railway

with the air conditioners installed from another company from
which they were purchased.

They were in use for nearly a

year before Mr. Raab had bumped his head on it and there had
been no complaints or anything to indicate to Utah Railway
that anybody would bump their head as opposed to just simply
ducking until they were out from under it. And like all
13
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locomotives that are required to be inspected on a regular
basis for compliance with federal regulations, there is no
evidence that anybody ever determined that these locomotives
were in violation of any federal railroad administration
regulation, that it never was cited, never had to pay any
penalty because of the existence of the air conditioners.
And so the basis of our motion simply is in light
of the case law and what's required for there to be a
violation, there simply, as a matter of law, cannot be
liability based on the violation of that statute.

The

plaintiff can go forward and argue that, you know, although
not a violation the railroad shouldn't have had it, a
reasonable person wouldn't have had it, that there can be a
claim of negligence in which case the railroad also can argue
that the plaintiff contributorily was negligent and should
have continued to duck until he took another step and was out
from underneath it.
So those are the two motions for summary judgment
that the railroad has brought.

If the Court grants the

railroad's first one regarding the dynamic brake, that also
moots the discovery motions in that the plaintiff seek
discovery, more discovery than what already had been provided
regarding the dynamic brake and the Court then would have to
- if that motion is denied, would then have to find that the
particular discovery that they request warrants the
14
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1

additional interrogatories and requests that are beyond that

2

allowed under the rules.

3

basis is - and we don't want to hold back any information

4

that this Court finds to be relevant - but the true basis for

5

not providing that discovery is it's definitely not believed

6

to be relevant because of the issue that the dynamic brake is

7

too far out there and really has nothing to do with liability

8

in this case.

9

THE COURT:

So that's a basis, but the real

Okay, thank you.

10

MR. MCGARVEY:

Again, I apologize.

11

MR. THOMPSON:

Good morning Your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. THOMPSON:

Good morning, Mr. Thompson.
I'd like to spend my time helping

14 I the Court narrow and focus the issue first with respect to
15

the dynamic brake issue on the Utah Railway 506.

16

agree for the purposes of this motion that the dynamic brake

17

was non-operative and that that would constitute a defect and

18

the parties agree that the issue of causation is a necessary

19

element under the Locomotive Inspection Act and the parties

20

agree that the causation standard for both the FELA claim and

21

the Locomotive Inspection Act is that of the FELA under 45,

22

United States Code Section 51.

23

The parties

The Court's examination of this issue I would think

24

would begin directly at the statute because the statute

25

dynamically changed the common law existent at the time FELA
15
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was passed.

The statute says that a railroad is responsible

to its employees for its negligence which is a cause in whole
or in part and that was a radical change from the common law
as it existed at that time.

The statute has been interpreted

by the United States Supreme Court through the liberal policy
behind the FELA also exemplified by Congress in terms of
passing the act to create liberal recovery on the part of the
employee.

Rogers vs. Missouri Pacific, United States Supreme

Court 1957 is the sentinel case that defines for all courts
what the causation standard under the FELA actually is.
In that case the Court held as follows:

Under this

statute, the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs
justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence
played any part, even the slightest in producing the injury
or death for which damages are sought.
The Supreme Court has defined the in whole or in
part standard of the statute to mean just that, that if
employer conduct played any part, even the slightest in
bringing about the injury then the employer is responsible
and more importantly what Rogers stands for, the case must be
submitted to the jury because the case makes it clear that
Congress intended a greater percentage of these cases go to
the jury and be determined by the jury because that's part of
the FELA remedy and all of those materials are cited in my
briefs.
16
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The court went on to say that "The kind of misperception evidenced in the opinion below", that is the
Missouri Supreme Court, "which fails to take into account the
special features of this statutory negligence action that
make it significantly different from the ordinary common law
negligence action has required this court to review a number
of cases.

In a relatively large percentage of the cases

reviewed this Court has found that the lower courts have not
given proper scope to this integral part of the congressional
scheme."
We reach the same conclusion in this case, that is
the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Rogers.
goes on to say, this important (inaudible).

It then

"The decisions

of this court after the 1939 amendments teach that the
Congress vested the power of decisions in these actions
exclusively in the jury and all but the infrequent case where
fair minded jurors cannot honestly differ whether fault of
the employer played any part in the employee's injury."
The evidence in this case, Your Honor, demonstrates
that there was a defective dynamic brake on the lead
locomotive of the locomotive consist on the evening of May
31, 2002 and that Mr. Wood, the engineer and Mr. Raab
determined that it was not safe because of that defect for
them to take a 12,000 ton coal train and descend down Provo
Canyon.

In the effort to make that locomotive consist safe
17
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1

again so that they could descend that canyon, they were

2 j required to shuffle or shift a series of locomotives back and
3

forth which involved not only taking the offending locomotive

4 j off the point and storing it, but also moving other
5

locomotives onto the point so they were required to make a

6 j number of shifting or switching moves with these various
7

locomotives over the course of about four hours.

And the

8

evidence demonstrates, the record demonstrates in this case

9 I that Mr. Raab, as part and parcel of that remedy, was
10

required to either walk back through the locomotive units or

11

walk back on the ground in order to couple and uncouple

12 j locomotives and/or isolate those locomotives with their
13 j electronic isolation button on the back door of the
14

electrical panel and/or switch the control panels in those

15

following locomotives into a position where they would all

16 I operate automatically from the control of the lead locomotive
17

once the train got underway, a condition known as multiple

18

coupled control.

19 |

Now, the Wilson case that I cited to Your Honor in

20 | our brief which is Wilson vs. Union Pacific at 56 Fed Third
21 j 1226, a Tenth Circuit Court case from 1995 is a very good
22 | example of why this case does meet the legal standard for
23

causation under the Locomotive Inspection Act.

24

brakes on one of the cars dynamited, that is they

25

automatically applied causing the train to go into an

27

In Wilson,

emergency stop.

The cause of that emergency stop was

defective brake equipment on that particular car, a violation
of the Safety Appliance Act which, like the Locomotive
Inspection Act, imposes absolute liability for a defect which
is a cause in whole or in part for plaintiff's injury.

Mr.

Wilson was required pursuant to his job to walk the train.
Mr. Wilson actually got to the defect and he actually
repaired the defect but while walking back to the locomotive
in order to reboard his train so they could get back
underway, Mr. Wilson stepped in a number of muddy or frozen
ruts that were beside the track and injured himself as a
result of that.
The railroad, Union Pacific in that case, said that
there was no causation as a matter of law because it was not
the defect, the brakes, that actually injured Mr. Wilson but
instead it was the muddy rut, just as defendant does in this
case.

The Tenth Circuit said that under the Rogers standard

of causation in whole or in part no matter how slight, that
Mr. Wilson's injury was within the ambient of the emergency
caused by the brake and because Mr. Wilson was returning from
the repair that he had accomplished occasioned

by the defect

he was still within the circumstance or danger created by the
defect.

Wilson is directly on point, Wilson has not been

overruled.

Wilson is out of the Tenth Circuit and is

controlling in this case and defendant does not contend
19
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otherwise.
Instead, Your Honor, defendant takes the position
that the causation standard in this case, at least in its
opening brief, was one that was, if you will, defined by the
incidental situation of condition standard that was
originally enunciated in Lang vs. New York Central in 1921.
I would submit to Your Honor that the doctrine that
originated in Lang was a very short lived one.

It found some

mention two years later in 1923 in Davis vs. Wolfe although
the court in Davis found liability for a loose grab iron than
caused the plaintiff to come off the train even though the
cause of the force that threw him from the train was arguably
(inaudible) slack action as opposed to the looseness.

The

railroad in that case made the same argument that defendant
made here in its arguing papers that the incidental condition
rule applied.
Ultimately in 192 6 the court began to move away
from that in the Juno case which I've cited in my papers at
Page 14, where again, the train broke in two because of the
defective coupler, plaintiff walked back to the train and
tried to get the train together again and while attempting to
adjust the draw bar, his pry bar slipped, he fell backwards
and fell off a bridge.

The court in that case rejected the

incidental condition circumstance and applied the in whole or
in part standard.

Rogers, however, being a post 1939
20
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amendment case says that those narrow constructions do not
apply and instead the broad remedial purpose of Rogers is the
law.
It is interesting to me, Your Honor, this morning,
just to give you a rough measure of the credibility of those
arguments, I shepherdized both the Lang decision and I
shepherdized the Rogers decision.

Lang is 86 years old and

it's been cited a total of 91 times, none of those recently.
More importantly, at least a third of those citations are
highly critical of Lang.

In contrast Rogers has been cited

3222 times in its 50-year history.

I think that gives you,

although not a scientific study, some measure of the impact
of the Rogers decision upon FELA litigation, particularly in
a causation hearing.
In its - well, let me say this, from your
standpoint, trying to put myself in your shoes to make this
decision, I had to find my self absolutely stunned that
defendant failed to cite to you the Rogers case in its
opening brief.

Having practiced FELA litigation for 31 years

- and I know Mr. McGarvey has done the same - absolutely
stunned to see a motion against a causation element that does
not even inform the Court about Rogers.

Instead, Your Honor,

defendant relied upon two cases, the Lang case I've already
discussed and more importantly Green vs. River Terminal, a
Sixth Circuit case from 1985.

Importantly - and I agree, the
21
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opinion does dot the old Lang incidental condition view of
causation but as I pointed out in my brief, Green was
overruled and isn't even good law within the circuit from
which it came.

Within a matter of 10 years the Sixth Circuit

reexamined that standard.

Green was decided on the basis of

the 1931 Sixth Circuit Court case Reats. Reats relied upon
Lang and relied upon Davis vs. Wolfe language to adapt the
condition or circumstance rule for causation.

The Sixth

Circuit said in light of Rogers we reject our own holding.
We reject the Davis rationale and the Lang rationale and we
hold that Rogers controls.

The Court said this, "We now join

those Courts that have rejected Reats in the light of Rogers
and hold that Reats no longer is good law.

Courts in Safety

Appliance Act and FELA and Locomotive Inspection Act cases as
well should focus on whether a reasonable jury could conclude
that the defective appliance played any part, even the
slightest, in bringing about the plaintiff's injury.

This

means that if a reasonable jury could find that the
plaintiff's injury was within the risk created by the
defective appliance, the plaintiff's right to a jury trial
should be preserved.

For example, if as a result of a

defective appliance a plaintiff is required to take action
and he or she is injured while taking those actions, the
issue of causation generally should be submitted to a jury."
That's exactly what Mr. Raab was doing here.

That's exactly
22
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what Mr. Wilson was; doing when he stepped in that muddy rut
and in b oth instances here, two Circuit Court case s have said
that the causation standard under the FELA follow!ng Rogers
is broad enough to encompass that behavior and all remedial
actions created by the defect in order to, as a matter of
law, allow a jury t o find that that was a cause in whole or
in part of the plaintiff's injury.
Lastly, Your Honor, and perhaps most significantly,
I think given the acrimony in this case and the energy that
the parties have put into this case which I think is obvious
to the Court, whatever decision you make in this case, Your
Honor, is likely to end up before the Utah Court of Appeals.
That is particularly troubling to me because defendants in
their opening brief failed to cite to you Christensen vs.
Union Pacific Railroad.

Christensen holds as a matter of law

that the Utah Court of Appeals will follow Rogers and will
apply Rogers.
In that case the court said the following, "We
assess whether Christensen has met this burden, that is a
Motion for Summary Judgment for causation, by viewing his
case in light of the applicable substantive evidentiary
standard of proof" "and a firm denial of the motion if
Christensen has provided a minimum of evidence to allow a
'fair minded jury' uto return a verdict for you."

Under this

statute, that is the FELA, the test of a jury case is simply
23
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whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that
employer negligence played any part even the slightest, in
providing the injury or death for which damage are sought,
citing Rogers vs. Missouri.
The court then goes on to say and I quote, "Under
FELA, where liability depends largely upon unique
circumstances of each case, Congress vested the power of
decision in these actions exclusively in the jury in all but
the infrequent cases where fair minded jurors cannot honestly
differ whether fault of the employer played any part in the
employee's injury" citing Rogers once again.

Not only is

Christensen significant for its language in terms of adapting
and applying to Utah the broad Rogers standard of causation
in FELA litigation in this state.
Mr. McGarvey and Mr. Savage knew that before they
filed this motion because they were counsel of record for
defendant Union Pacific Railroad in Christensen and yet they
failed to cite this case to the Court.

I think that is

significant in and of itself Your Honor because that says
that in fact Rogers is indeed the rule followed by this state
and will be applied in this matter.
THE COURT:

Mr. Thompson, if this at all - the

dynamic brake issue and the removal of 5006 that occurred the
week before the injury, would there be liability by the
railroad?
24
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MR. THOMPSON:
Honor,

I'm not sure I understand, Your

Do you mean if the 506 had not been there that night?
THE COURT:

No.

Let's say that it was a week

earlier that the 506 had a problem and Mr. Raab hit his head
a week later still in this other rail car.

Would there still

be a connection?
MR. THOMPSON:

Oh, I see.

I see.

In other words,

you're drawing out the time continuation.
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. THOMPSON:

Well, the answer to that would

depend on whether Mr. Raab spent a week trying to repair the
dynamic brake and I think your hypothetical implies that was
not the case and I think to answer your question,
dynamically, the issue that is fundamental here to the
causation envelope is whether or not the employee was engaged
in the remedy of the defect at the time of the injury.

If in

fact as the Wilson court says, Mr. Wilson had actually
returned safely to the locomotive and they had gotten
underway and he then had an injury where he bumps his knee or
bumps his head or all the other pretty horribles that Mr.
21 | McGarvey has suggested, then the answer is no because the
22 I remedy had been affected and the danger posed by the defect
I
23 | had been ameliorated. I would completely agree. But that's
|
24 j not the case here with Mr. Raab and that's what's critical.
25

Factual issues, the factual record in this case says he was
25
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in that locomotive because the dynamic was a defect that had
stopped progress of his train and he and Mr. Wood were still
in the process of remedying that defect to make the train
safe to proceed down Provo Canyon when he was injured.
Therefore, he was within the envelope of the defect.

I hope

that's clear.
THE COURT:

I understand your position.

MR. THOMPSON:

Thusly, Your Honor, I want to

briefly talk about the Sorrel case.

Sorrel is a 2007 Supreme

Court case which defendant cited in its brief.
Let me preface it by one thing, in its response
reply brief, essentially I understand defendant to be
dropping the incidental condition or situation defense and
instead asking this Court to grasp onto the talisman of
proximate cause.

I will be the first to agree that there is

much language within the FELA that says proximate cause is
necessary under the FELA.

There are many cases that say that

and there is this great confusion about whether it's a
proximate cause standard or an actual cause standard or
whether the proximate cause has been done away with
altogether and frankly I find it all very unfortunate because
proximate cause, as we know from our struggle with Mrs.
Fallsgraph in law school, is a term that means different
things to different people and therefore, means nothing to
most of us in terms of trying to decide these issues.
26
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Again Your Honor, I would refer you back to the

1

The statute says

u

in whole or

2

statute that touched on it.

3

in part'' and Rogers says that means no matter how slight.

4

The proximate cause standard has been ejected and Justice

5

Suitter in his concurrence in the Sorel case suggested

6

proximat e cause had always been the standard.
Just incidentally, the Sorrel opinion was one

7

where, as most of these probl era cases come from from St.
Louis fo r some reason, in Missouri they had a practice where
10 I the causation standards by instructions were different for
11

the plaintiff's claim against the railroad and the railroad's

12

claim for contributory negligence against the plaintiff.

13

Clearly unfair.

14

court took that issue on, certified that case for certiorari

15

took that issue and said no, that's not - we're going to say

16

that's not fair.

17

cert was granted however, Northfork and Western tried to -

18

I'm sorry, Millfork Southern tried to, if you will, bootstrap

19

the further issue of what is the causation standard in the

20

FELA.

21

comments in his concurring opinion talked about the proximate

22

cause standard.

23

It's informative and perhaps gives us some guidance but at

24

the same time what I want to draw your attention to is the

25

concurrence of Justice Ginsburg which I think may be the most

It didn't apply the same standard and the

That was the issue cited by Sorrel.

Once

The court rejected that but Justice Suitter in

That a 3-person concurrence is not binding.
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eloquent explanation of all of this confusion about proximate
cause that I've read in the entirety of the FELA litigation.
Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence says the following, "The
Court today simply holds" I'm sorry, "holds simply and only
that in cases under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
railroad negligence and employee contributory negligence are
governed by the same causation standard.
judgment.

I concur in that

It should be recalled however that the Court has

several times stated what a plaintiff must prove to warrant
submission of an FELA case to a jury.

That question is long

so we have no cause to reexamine it and I do not read the
Court's decision to cast a shadow of a doubt on the matter."
In Consolidated Rail Corporation vs. Gottschall, we
acknowledge that a "relaxed causation standard applies under
FELA."

In Crane vs. Cedar Rapids we said that an FELA

plaintiff need to prove "only that his injury resulted in
whole or in part from the railroad's violation."

Both

decision refer to the Court's off sided opinion in Rogers vs.
Missouri which declared "under FELA, the test of a jury case
is simply whether the proof is justified with reason the
conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages
are sought."
Rogers, in turn, drew upon Coreh vs. Southern
Pacific in which the court observed "Congress imposed
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extraordinary safety obligations upon railroads and has
conuaanded that if a breach of these obligations continues in
part to an employee's death, the railroad must pay damages."
These decisions answer the question Northfork sought to
''smuggle into" this case.

What is the proper standard of

causation for railroad negligence under FELA?

Todays opinion

leaves in place precedent solidly establishing that the
causation standard in FELA actions is more relaxed than tort
litigation generally.

And this is what she says that I think

is the touchstone for all of us, "A few further points bear
emphasis.

First, it is sometimes said that Rogers eliminated

proximate cause in FELA actions."
won't trouble you with.

She makes citations that I

"During the first half of this

century is was customary for courts to analyze liability
under FELA in terms of proximate causation.

It would be more

accurate as I see it" she says, "to recognize that Rogers
described the test for proximate causation applicable in FELA
suits.

That test is whether employer negligence played any

part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death
for which damages are sought."
In other words, what Justice Ginsburg is telling us
is that proximate causation as discussed in all these many
cases all these years means exactly what Rogers said, in
whole or in part, even in the slightest.

That is a means,

Your Honor, by which you can reconcile all of these cases to
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produce a consistent result that is consistent with the
authorities that will be applied to determine this decision;
that is, Coreh vs Southern Pacific and the Rogers decision in
the Supreme Court; Wilson and Standard out of the Tenth
circuit; and Christensen out of your own Utah Court of
Appeals.

Under all of those Your Honor, I would ask the

7 i motion be dismissed.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Anything further Mr. McGarvey?
MR. MCGARVEY:

I think I want to address -

MR. THOMPSON:

Shall I address the summary judgment

issue with respect to the —
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. THOMPSON:

Your Honor, I don't know what has

happened here but I can only tell you this, I personally put
my Motion in Opposition into the mail to you and sent a cover
letter with it, a bench copy to you and I'm stunned that it
hasn't arrived because it hasn't come back.
THE COURT:

Things - we get literally thousands of

documents filed in this courthouse and this is everything.
The latest thing I have from you is let's see, I got the
November 30 binder which supposedly has everything but it
didn't have that in it and then I have the November 20,
November 16 letters from you and neither one of those contain
anything about additional interrogatories and requests for
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decision but....
COURT CLERK: (inaudible).
THE COURT: There is something that's been filed
here, of course, as I said gentlemen, maybe that's my fault.
Maybe I should look at the file as well but (inaudible) of
those memos are here in the file.

The problem is as I said,

I didn't look at the file I looked at what was given to me
so. . .
MR. THOMPSON:

My understanding of the rule and I

looked at several of the bench copy rules from some of your
colleagues, my understanding was that the moving party,
according to our last conversation was always responsible for
everything responsible for that motion.
THE COURT: That's right
MR. THOMPSON: And since this isn't my motion, I

j

presume that Mr. - and I'm not blaming Mr . McGarvey, I think
something has happened.

So I understood that my

responsibilit;/ was to provide you with a notebook on my
discovery issues.

1

THE COURT: That's right

|

MR. THOMPSON: And I've done that and that's why I

j didn't do that here.
THE COURT:
file.

Again, I apologize.
I note that (inaudible) they are in the

That's probably my fa ult.

Maybe I should look at the

file before I came to court.
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MR. THOMPSON:

All right.

We begin, Your Honor

with the second Motion for Summary Judgment which is
essentially defendant's claim that the air conditioner in the
6000 class locomotive in which Mr. Raab struck the top of his
head and herniated the disc in his neck as a result of that
compressive blow, cannot as a matter of law rise to the level
of a defect actionable under the Locomotive Inspection Act.
I'm concerned because the Court hasn't had the opportunity to
read the papers in this case but essentially THE COURT:

I'll read the papers before I make that

decision, that's for sure.
MR. THOMPSON:
that.

And I understand.

I appreciate

Defendant essentially takes the position that only a

mechanical defect can rise to the level of a defect
actionable under the Locomotive Inspection Act and nothing
could be truer.

It says in his papers that essentially it's

headline is liability under LIA is limited to mechanical
defects.

In Lilly which I will submit to you the touchstone

case in the area of Locomotive Inspection Act defects and
Lilly is United Supreme Court case found at 317 U.S. 481.
Lilly was a case where there was no mechanical defect with
respect to the tender on steam locomotives whatsoever.

There

was the predecessor to the Federal Railroad Administration,
Interstate Commerce Commission, the ICC had a rule that
precluded water from pooling on it but it didn't mention ice.
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There as a coating of ice over the top of the tender which
made it slippery and Mr. Lilly was injured while trying to
put water into the tender, he slipped on the ice and fell and
was seriously injured.

The railroad took the position that

because there was no mechanical defect on the tender, nothing
broker, nothing not working, nothing not functional, that in
fact there was no LIA violation, similar to exactly what
counsel is arguing here in this case.

The court in Lilly

said the following, "For various cases denying recovery under
the act, respondent tends to extract a general rule that the
act covers only defects in construction or mechanical
operation and affords no protection against the presence of
dangerous objects or foreign matter.

But there is no warrant

in the language of the act for construing it so narrowly or
for denying the commission power, commission of the ICC to
remedy shortcomings other than purely mechanical defects
which may make operation unsafe."

It then says with

emphasis, "The act without limitation speaks of equipment xin
proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary
peril to life or limb.'

Conditions other than mechanical

imperfections can plainly render equipment unsafe to operate
without unnecessary peril to life or limb."

They then go on

to say, "A use of a tender upon his (inaudible) employee must
go in the course of his duties which is covered in ice seems
to us to involve ^unnecessary peril to life or limb' enough
33

42

so as to permit jury to find the Boiler Inspection Action,
not the Locomotive Inspection Act has been violated.""

In

other words THE COURT:

Let me ask you this question.

If we

look at the theory about the ice on it, isn't that somewhat
different than an object that is stationary, that hasn't got
anything that's caused it to become unsafe, I mean it just
literally exists.

If he had fallen off the roof of the

tender and the tender was dry, would it have the same result
as if he fell off the ice?
MR. THOMPSON:

No - well, not under your factual

circumstance because there would be arguably no unsafe
condition.

I mean, unless there was something else that

caused him to slip and fall.

But he just fell off, no, I

would agree there would not be a defect because it would not
make the locomotive unsafe.

My argument is this, a

mechanical defect is not necessary in order to violate the
act in a finding.
THE COURT:

I understand that point and I assume,

I'm accepting that as true but then what is the - how then
does this air conditioning unit fit underneath the theory of
non-mechanical defective?
MR. THOMPSON:

Because precisely as the Third

Circuit found in the Delevie vs. Reading case.
THE COURT:

What case?
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MR. THOMPSON:

Delevie D-E-L-E-V-I-E v. Reading,

R-E-A-D-I-N-G Co., 176 Fed Second 496, Third Circuit 1949.
That case is substantially similar here and I submit to Your
Honor controls.

Mr. Delevie was an engineer.

boarding an engine which was stationary.

He was

There was - and the

access that he utilized was a set of steps that then went to
a footboard and a walkway that went alongside of the engine
up to the cab and I think you can see a factual similarity to
what we have here whereas Mr. Raab was walking across the
nose of the locomotive, opened this five foot door that has,
excuse me, five foot six door that has a window that's about
five feet high at the top, opens the door and ducks under and
stands up into a ceiling that's now at least eight to ten
inches lower than is normally in a locomotive because of this
after market air conditioner, and strikes his head.

In

Delevie, just like in this case, there was a device which was
not, in and of itself, non-functional.

There was a reverse

rear gear that was positioned on the locomotive so that it
jutted out from the side of the locomotive and over thi2
walkway so that it r educed the walk board from approximately
27 inche s down to 10

While on his way to the cab Mr.

1 Delevie fell off the locomotive, struck his heaid and d:Led as
a result of that fall several dalys later.
THE COURT:

He was trying to get around this in

this sma 11 area, is that what you're sayincf? I assume that
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that's what that has

to be connected

MR. THOMPSON:
proof.

—

That was the proof.

That was the

A jury was - the case when to a jury and the jury

returned a verdict that said that the reverse gear mechanism
installed horizontally above the metal footwalk made access
to the cab unsafe and that the location of that mechanism was
a cause of the accident and that is precisely the claim that
is being made here.
THE COURT:

In that case was that sort of an after

market installation or is that the way the train came?
MR. THOMPSON:

That is the way the train apparently

came although the case is not clear about that.
does say there that well, let me cite that.

The court

According to

defendant, the Interstate Commerce Commission, not the FRA,
required the mechanism as installed in 1941, the gear still
left a 10 inch walkway clearance required by the IC regs and
the location of the mechanism was selected by qualified
personnel of defendant and had passed Interstate Commerce
Commission inspections."

Now in this case, these locomotives

were built in Australia by a subsidiary of (inaudible) Motor
Division of General Motors by Hammersly and were sold to an
Australian incident and it is probable, although we don't
know for sure that they were installed in Australia at the
time.

In other words, they are an after market bolt in type

of device but they were installed after construction.

At
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least that's what I understand from defendant's interrogatory
answers in this case that I have attached.
THE COURT:

It appears under this - is it Delevie?

MR. THOMPSON: Delevie.
THE COURT: It doesn't make any difference whether
it's after market.
MR. THOMPSON:

I don't think so.

I don't think so.

Absolutely not because remember, this is a statute that is
not a negligence statute.

It doesn't matter whether the unit

was safe the day before and the day after, it doesn't matter
whether it functioned 10 minute beforehand and 10 minutes
later, the LIA imposes upon the railroad the extraordinary
duty to make sure that its locomotive is safe at all times
when the locomotive is in use.

The way the railroad can

avoid liability is to take the locomotive out of service or
insure, insure that its locomotive is safe and in proper
condition to operate.

That's the burden that the Locomotive

Inspection Act places.
after market or not.

It makes no difference whether it's
Once it's installed on the locomotive

it is an appurtenance and therefore the railroad has the duty
to make sure that it is safe to be used in service.
THE COURT:

That's the question that the jury has

to decide.
MR. THOMPSON:

It certainly is, absolutely.

I

completely concur.
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This is what the court said in Delevie.

"The

physical setup which resulted was one which the jury found to
j be unsafe.

In other words, a locomotive, no single part of

which is installed or maintained in violation of the Boiler
Inspection Act may still provide an unsafe place to work and
so violate the act."

That's Delevie at 497.

Delevie is

still good law.
So, and I would refer to you as well the cases that
are cited in my brief which are Lewisville vs. Botes, a 1949
Eighth Circuit case and Bollen vs. Lehi Valley, a 1948 Second
Circuit case.

Both of those cases hold as well, Your Honor,

that there is no need to prove a violation of a particular
FRA regulation to invoke liability under the act because the
railroad has the twin duties of both meeting all the minimum
standards of the Federal (inaudible) Administration

on

locomotive safety and the higher duty under the Locomotive
Inspection Act of insuring that the locomotive is safe and in
proper conditions at all times it is intended to be used on
the line.

All right.
All right.

Counsel mentioned the fact of the 407

issue and subsequently the measures and evidence that I put
in.

Although the Court hasn't read the briefs yet and I

understand, let me take two minutes to layout the factual
precedence for that.

In its brief defendant took the

position that the Locomotive Inspection Act is not violated
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when "the condition has been in place for years without
incident or reports of injury."

That's directly from

defendant's memorandum in support at Page 12.

Whether or not

that's the law - and I suggest to you in my brief that it is
not, that is a factual mistake.

We'd introduced evidence to

show because the railroad had directly made that an issue in
this case by saying that (inaudible) essentially that this
condition had been in place for years and had not been a
problem.

The following, all we know is that these units were

manufactured in Australia and were there for approximately 12
years.

What their history in Australia was in terms of

injury with these, we have no idea and it's not in the
record.

All we do know is that in Australia they weren't

subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act.

When they came

here they were acquired by the railroad in approximately May
of 2001 and were put into service sometime between June 30
and July 14th of 2001.

Plaintiff was then injured on this

locomotive as a result in whole or in part of this position,
10 months later.

We then know that on February 4, 2004,

approximately 19 months later, one of the plaintiff
coworkers, Steven Duane Clifton, another conductor employed
by defendant struck his head and felt pain in his neck as a
result of striking his head in the same fashion inside a 6000
class locomotive and the record shows that all of these five
6000 class locomotives are identical in terms of their inside
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proportions with their unit inside.
What we know is also from Mr. Bladuct who is r.he
person who is specifically in charge of maintenance for Utah
Railway by his own testimony, that in response to a direction
from Genesis in Wyoming, Utah Railways parent corporation all
of the units were then removed approximately two weeks later.
Defendant then came back in its reply brief and said to us
that those are subsequent remedial measures and can't be
considered.

Well, first of all, they opened the door, they

made that an issue because they took the position that there
was a history of no defects or no problems for years and
years and years with this particular
true.

unit and that's not

407 allows impeachment and the rule in 407 —
THE COURT:

Well, where's there evidence that there

was problems before Mr. Raab?
MR. THOMPSON:
the point.

There is no evidence but that's not

The subsequent remedial measures, it is

admissible to prove that their statement to you that this had
been in place for years and years without problems or reports
is not accurate and —
THE COURT:

How is that established that's in the

record?
MR. THOMPSON:
himself.

Because, in fact, Mr. Raab hurt

Mr. Clifton hurt himself, and then the railroad

removed this condition in response to Mr. Clifton's injury as
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they have indicated in their papers.
THE COURT:

It seems to me what I hear them saying

is that we didn't have any problems, we had a problem with
Raab, we didn't do anything/ but then we had a second problem
and we decided well maybe there is a problem here so we take
them out.
MR. THOMPSON:
THE COURT:

Right.

And that -

And that's not a remedial measure?

MR. THOMPSON:

It would be a remedial measure if it

was introduced for the purpose of demonstrating culpability
but 407 goes on, although defendant didn't cite it in their
brief, it goes on to say that for other purposes, narrower
purposes, there are exceptions to 407 which will allow that
same evidence in and one of those exceptions is impeachment
and this relevant to that issue.
THE COURT:

I guess I'm missing how that's relevant

for impeachment purposes.
MR. THOMPSON:

Well, if you're going to consider

their factual legal argument to you that somehow the absence
of complaints or reports demonstrates that somehow there is a
lack of problem and therefore there is no proof (inaudible) a
violation then you need to know that in fact that
representation to you is not true.
THE COURT:

I guess I'm missing the boat here but

what I hear you saying is, is that we can impeach their
41

50

statement that there were no problems prior to Mr. Raab by
the fact that they removed them after Mr. Raab and another
man that was injured.

Somehow that establishes that there

were problems beforehand.
MR. THOMPSON:

How does that do that?
No, and here's the problem, Your

Honor, you're - with all due respect, I think this is the
misconception, there is nothing in any of this evidence about
prior to Raab.

The representation is that there was nothing

wrong with these units because there was never a problem,
they had been in place for years.

My evidence is simply

saying it doesn't matter prior or past, it doesn't matter
before or after for the simple purpose of impeaching their
statement that there were no problems with these units
whatsoever, that is not true.

There were two problems and in

fact as a result of those problems this company's parent
ordered that those units be removed.
THE COURT:

So you're saying that statement that

they've never been a problem?
MR. THOMPSON:
THE COURT:

Period.

MR. THOMPSON:
THE COURT:

Right.

Correct.

This statement is made sometime after

the second incident.
MR. THOMPSON:
THE COURT:

Correct.

Therefore it makes it...
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MR. THOMPSON:
THE COURT:

Correct.

Okay.

MR. THOMPSON:

There are a number of exceptions to

407 that are applicable here.

Although it is apparently not

the law of Utah and I do not find a federal case on point,
there are some authorities and there is an Oregon case called
Vancott vs. PGE that basically says that if the subsequent
remedial measures are taken in response, not to plaintiff's
injury, but to someone else's injury, the policy
considerations that support subsequent remedial measure 407
exclusion no long exist because the policy (inaudible) 407 is
to encourage people to make repairs before someone else is
injured again and the law wants to, of course, emphasize that
but if the repair is actually made not in response to Raab's
injury but it's made in response to Clifton's injury, 19
months later, then the policy implications behind that
evaporate and therefore there's no reason to enforce the
subsequent remedial measure.

I don't have the citation.

appears not to be the law of Utah.

It

It's not that it's been

denied but I see nothing in that and the law in Utah on this
subject is pretty sparse but I would suggest to you that that
is another rational reason to invoke the exceptions of the
407.
In addition, 407 exceptions are for parties.

In

other words, there are a number of cases and I will give you
43

52

those citations in just a minute that say that if the
remedial measure is actually made by a non-party - by a third
3 I party, that 407 does not come into play whatsoever and the
4 i record here is that Utah Railway didn't take out these air
5 j conditioning units, Genesis in Wyoming, its parent ordered
6 | that in response to Mr. Clifton's injury.

That is in

7 \ attachment to Mr. Bladuct's deposition and it is also at
8 I Exhibit 6 to Mr. Bladuct's deposition.
9

There is a work order

there that says the following, ''Remarks. Upon G&W's request,

10

removed air conditioner from cab following a safety complaint

11

from crew members."

12

represent to you that Mr. Bladuct in his deposition testified

13

that G&W means Genesis in Wyoming.

14

is the parent corporation of the Utah Railway and that he was

15

ordered to do that by Jim Davis who is the Chief Executive

16

Officer of the parent.

That was on 6062, February 2004 and I'll

He testified that the G&W

He is also the Chief Executive

17 j Officer and President of the Utah Railway.

We'll definitely

So he wears both hats but

18

make you aware of that right now.

19

the request was from, in fact, Mr. Davis wearing his G&W hat

20 | according to the factual record in this case.
21

Sor

let me get to the cases that support those.

22

Here we are.

The case, Your Honor - and Irm not sure the

23 | pronunciation is Mehojah M-E-H-O-J-A-H vs. Drummond.

It is

24 I the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals out of Oklahoma, a 1995
25

case.

The citation is 56 Fed Third 1213 and in that case the
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1

!

Court held "Rule 407 only applies to a defendant's voluntary

2 j actions.

It is not applied to subsequent remedial measures

3 I by non-defendants."

It cites a host of federal cases from

the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit
and that's at Page 215.
So we have at least three exceptions to Rule 407 so
far in this case.

But by far the most significant, Your

Honor, is the issue of feasibility.

Again, 407 specifically

says that for narrower purposes including ownership, control,
feasibility and impeachment, 407 evidence may be received.
Defendant in its brief cited the Utah case of Schreiter
S-C-H-R-E-I-T-E-R vs. Wasatch Manor, Incorporated.
a Court of Appeals case from 1994.
Second 570.

That was

It's citation is 871 P

I have all these cases and I'm happy to leave

them with the Court if the Court would like that.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. THOMPSON:

In Schreiter, plaintiff was injured

while living in a boarding house when another resident at the
boarding house fell asleep while smoking in bed and caused a
major fire which caused her smoke inhalation injuries.

She

sued defendant, the Manor House, claiming that they were
negligent failing to supply the Manor House with a fire
sprinkler suppression system in a timely fashion.

The Manor

House was built at the point in time when the code
applications at the time did not require such.

There was an
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issue about whether or not the sprinkler system was feasible
in the sense that it could have been put in and the plaintiff
sought to call the Manor House superintendent who would have
testified as to the cost of the installation as being a
feasible alternative that the defendant should have taken.
The trial court excluded that evidence and the Court reversed
saying the following, "Whether something is feasible relates
not only to physical possibility, cost and convenience but
also to ultimate utility and success in attended
performance."

They cite a number of federal cases including

Anderson vs. Maloey and American Airlines Incorporation which
I'll talk about in a minute. I beg your pardon, I moved too
far.

I beg your pardon.

relies on.

I'm citing the next case that it

Please pardon me.

Again, they say that basically beginning at Page
573 of the Utah Appellate report, "While Schreiter argues
that the bid evidence is admissible to show feasibility of
installing such a system, the trial court found that it was
not within the feasibility exception to rule.

According to

the Court feasibility exemption applies only if there is an
issue as to whether or not the fire sprinkling systems
physically can be installed; however, neither the trial court
nor Wasatch Manor cites any authority for such a narrow
interpretation of Rule 407.
In fact, the fifth Circuit has noted just the
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opposite interpreting federal rule of evidence 407 of which
the Utah rule is an exact copy.

See Reese vs. Mercury Marine

Division of Burnswick Corporation, a Fifth Circuit Court case
from 1986 out of Texas" which I also have a copy for you
which holds the same.

According to the Reese court, "Whether

something is feasible relates not only to physical
possibility, cost and convenience but also to ultimate
utility and success in intended performance."
THE COURT:

Well, this isn't a feasibility issue is

it?
MR. THOMPSON:

Yes, because what they're saying to

is we let these units stay in, they were just great, nothing
was ever wrong and we don't know what Mr. Raab is talking
about.

They're just peachy keen.

If feasibility means

ultimate utility and success in intended performance which
the Utah Court of Appeals says it does here in this state,
I'm entitled to show that in fact they removed those units
because their installation and continued position in those
units was not ultimate utility and success in their intended
performance.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. THOMPSON:

In accord with that, Your Honor I

would highly recommend to you the 1969 case of American
Airlines Incorporated vs. United States which is also titled
Creasey vs. United States.

It is a Sixth Circuit case. It is
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at 418 Fed Second 1(e). American Airlines - the facts are
these.

There was an airplane crash of a 727 in the

Cincinnati airport in 1965 that killed 48 out of 52
passengers on board.

The crash occurred because the pilot

was flying in inclement weather at an elevation that was 200
feet below the mean elevation of the Cincinnati airport.
Evidence deduced that he was flying with a particular
altimeter drum that was faulty or at there's allegations that
it was faulty.

in that particular case, American Airlines

took the position that there was nothing wrong with the
altimeter drum and that it was safe to be utilized, yet they
replaced all of the altimeter drums in every 727 in their
fleet after that incident.

The Court there ruled that

because the defendant had, one, told the jury that in fact
that these things were great, there was entitlement to
impeach them because they had, in fact, made a change
subsequent to that and that was impeachment testimony or the
prior testimony about safety, about the utility of these
devices.
And secondly, because they put safety versus you
know, a lack of safety.

They made it an issue by, the

defendants made it an issue by putting that into evidence and
so plaintiffs were entitled to show by the subsequent
remedial measure that that in fact was not true and that
these were replaced.

Same issues are here.

The Court simply
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says very briefly, "On two occasions evidence precautions
taken by the defendants since the accident were admitted.

Of

course, the general rule is that such evidence is not
admissible to prove antecedent negligence; however, use of
such evidence for rebuttal or impeachment is permitted." I'm
citing Tyler v. Dowel Incorporated, Tenth Circuit 1960, 274
Fed Second 890 cert (inaudible) United State Supreme Court
363 US812, 1960.
In essence, Your Honor, I'm suggesting to you that
there are four, perhaps five exceptions that will allow all
of that evidence here to be considered by you in connection
with deciding this motion and it clearly shows that, in fact,
there was a defect in the locomotive by the placement or
position of the air conditioning unit as evidenced by the
fact that the defendants parent company removed them after
the incident.

You're entitled to consider that on the basis

of all of these exceptions in terms of finding whether or not
there was a defect that is cognizable under the LIA.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. THOMPSON:

I've talked a long time.

you for your patience, Your Honor.

I thank

I'd ask that you deny

both motions.
THE COURT:

Okay, Mr. McGarvey, anything you want

to say?
MR. MCGARVEY:

Yes, Your Honor.

There's been a lot
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of things said I'd like to address.
backwards.

I'll kind of go

Let's talk first about 407.

We need to remember

that what we're talking about here is, is there a liability
here for violation of the safety statute?

Keeping that in

mind, going over these various things that Mr. Thompson just
talked about, feasibility first of all.

407 deals with

feasibility of doing the act, the subsequent remedial
measure.

That's what it addresses.

If a party takes the

position that the act, in this case removing air conditioners
couldn't be done, then evidence of removing air conditioners
could come in to prove that it's possible, feasible to
remover air conditioners.

The other cases that Mr. Thompson

cited regarding intended performance or utility of device,
that is a completely different situation.
to do with this case.

That has nothing

If this case were about whether the

air conditioners functioned as air conditioners, had utility
as an air conditioner, that was their intended purpose and we
took the position that they did and if that were an issue which it's not - if that were an issue and then we took them
out, then they could present that as evidence to say, well,
they really didn't work as air conditioners because you took
them out but that is not an issue in this case and it
certainly is not an issue with respect to whether the safety
statute is violated because of the mere existence of the air
conditioners.

So feasibility argument is off point, it has
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nothing to do with these issues and for purposes of the third
party, mode of power taking them out, Utah Railway doesn't do
that work.
done.

It doesn't do the mechanical work, it hires it

That doesn't mean it didn't have the work done.

The

time period argument made by Mr. Thompson, the evidence will
be that the air conditioners were taken out because as Your
Honor knows, there was one and then finally another incident
and the company finally said, well, you know, let's take them
out.

Let's don't let there be any issue.
THE COURT:

He's not saying that the workman who

removed it has something to do with it.

He's saying the

third party is the party who directed your client to do it?
MR. MCGARVEY:
he's absolutely wrong.
company.

Oh no.

If that's what he's saying,

Genesis in Wyoming is the parent

It is Utah Railway, it directs Utah Railway.

It is

the entity then who, for purposes of paperwork and that sort
of thing, has the contract with Motor Power and those sorts
of things.

The decision was made by Mr. Davis as Mr. Bladuct

testified in his deposition who is the local President of
Utah Railway who made that decision and the air conditioners
were then taken out by the company, the parent company,
Genesis in Wyoming contracts to have that work done by.

So

for all of those reasons it doesn't come in but most
importantly it doesn't come in because the issue here is, is
25 j that evidence relevant for purposes of culpability?

It is
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relevant for purposes of showing that their mere existence is
a violation of the safety statute and our point simply is,
no, that subsequent remedial measure of taking air
conditioners out, that fact that they were taken out does not
make it more probable or likely that the statute was violated
as opposed to wasn't violated.

If anything, if it comes in

at all which we don't think it does, it comes in on the issue
that we're not here addressing of negligence.

Would a

reasonable man have taken them out sooner or later or what
would a reasonable man have done?

That's what it would go to

if anything but that is not the issue not before the Court
and that particular evidence certainly doesn't prove that
there was a safety violation.
Also, with respect to the Locomotive Inspection Act
issue Mr. Thompson talked about the Delevie case and I want
to just clarify what that case stood for.

In that case,

reading from it on Page 497 Mr. Thompson gave you the full
cite, we read, "The jury also found, however, that a power
reverse gear mechanism installed horizontally above the metal
footwork made access to the cab unsafe and that the location
of the mechanism was a cause of the subject."
on to describe what was meant by that.

It then went

It says, "The power

mechanism may have interfered with Delevie in reaching for
the handrail as he mounted the steps to the footwalk and so
throws him off balance as he reached that stage of his
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progress toward the cab.

To this we might add the distinct

possibility that the reverse gear, being situated only a foot
above the footwalk and cutting off more than half of the
walk, might well have made it particularly difficult for a
275 pound man like Delevie to maintain a secure grip on the
top portion of the handrail which too followed the preceding
curvature of the engine."
In that particular case the Court was looking at
did that gear box where it was located, although not a
violation of any regulation, did it make the locomotive as
the statute provides "unsafe to operate" and because Mr.
Delevie couldn't grab the handrail and couldn't make use of
safety devices on the locomotive in order to get into the
cab, that was the basis for the Delevie court
issue.

Then comparing that now to the facts before

this Court, the air conditioning unit didn't prevent Mr. Raab
from reaching any safety devices or from doing anything or
from being able to safely get into the cab.

He just merely

needed to walk into the cab and keep his bent down perhaps
another step more than he did rather than putting it up and
hitting it on the air conditioner.

The Delevie court did not

involve an injury where Mr. Delevie hit himself against that
object because it existed.

It caused a problem.

Lilly also as the Court I think understands but
just to highlight, again, addressed the issue of unsafe to
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operate, not unsafe.
off the tender.

Tenders are unsafe. Employees can fall

Locomotives aren't safe.

Employees can hit

their heads, bang their knees, fall off, do all sorts of
different things on a locomotive.

The issue is, was the

tender unsafe to operate and the court found that it was the
existence of ice that made it unsafe to operate as a tender
because of the existence of that foreign material.
of Raab, there is no foreign material.

The case

There was an air

conditioner that operated as it was intended, it was safe to
operate as an air conditioner and for those reasons, Your
Honor, the Locomotive Inspection Act is not held applicable
by those cases and we will refer you to the cases cited in
the briefs you will have an opportunity to read, the multiple
cases that talk about simply being injured on a locomotive
isn't a basis for a violation of the Safety Act or of any
regulation.

There has to be more.

There has to be some

defect and the mere existence of a locomotive and its parts
isn't a defect.
Moving on then to the 506 dynamic brake issue.

Let

start at the beginning on this one instead of working
backwards.

Rogers has been cited so many times because of

the conflict it has engendered in case law.

The Supreme

Court in Sorrel acknowledged in the concurring opinion
particularly that there was a conflict among the circuits and
that that issue will have to addressed although it wasn't
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squarely before them at that time.

Those three occurring

justices expressed their views on it and clearly pointed out
what Rogers meant.

The reason is perhaps going even further

back in time is that FELA statute is indeed a radical change.
It was enacted in the late 1800s.
negligence was a complete bar.

At that time contributory

Proximate cause in some cases

as in Missouri as we saw, meant that there had to be sole
cause as a component.

It was an extremely radical idea for

congress at that time to say that an employer could have some
negligence apart, in whole or in part and still be held
liable, or the plaintiff was liable, perhaps the employee was
99 percent liable and yet the railroad would be responsible.
That was a huge change in the law and all Rogers was
addressing was that huge change when it said even the
slightest which only means the railroad is one percent at
fault instead of not the sole cause.

Then the railroad could

be liable but only for that one percent of its fault.
the departure, that's all that's meant by slight.

That's

There are

cases that have misconstrued that, not United State Supreme
Court cases, lower court cases and some have gone so far as
to say that meets slight negligence or even slight causation
which as I was trying to say before and submit, makes no
sense.

Does that mean almost negligence?

definition for slight negligence.
it.

I mean, there's no

There's no way to apply

Kind of causation but not really cause?

I mean of
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course not.

It's negligence under the absolute standard that

we all understand, failure of a reasonable man to act. under
the circumstances as a reasonable man would.
but you know what I mean.

I messed it up

Causation is the same as well.

The statute was merely saying that if it's one percent in
6 j part then that's sufficient.

So Sorrel makes that very clear

7 | that that's all Rogers and all those other cases that go off
on those tangents, I warn the Court to be cautious about that
as you look at the cases submitted and by the briefs in this
10 | particular case.

So there's no dispute that if the railroad

i

11 | ' is one percent at fault with respect to the dynamic brake
12

this motion fails the plaintiff is allowed to proceed.

13

position simply is it cannot even be one percent fault

14

because it's simply too far removed.

15

Our

The 507 locomotive, just to make sure the facts are

16

clear in your mind, was set out.

It was taken out of the

17

unit and set aside.

18

engineer, will testify in this case and will say that it had

Mr. Raab has submitted that Booth, the

19 | completely been set out and was no longer part of the train.
20

Mr. Raab wasn't going to set it out, he wasn't returning from

21

setting it out, he wasn't going to repair the dynamic brake,

22

he wasn't returning from repairing the dynamic brake.

23

doing the job he was hired to do of making sure that this

24

train that he was taking over the summit was in proper

25

condition, aligned, coupled, the knobs were in the correct

He was
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positions they needed to be in order for the train to begin
movement down the hill into Provo.

He was doing a job that

he would have done regardless and wherever that train would
have been and regardless of what circumstances lead him to
have to make sure the train was ready to go.

If he were to

pick up a train in Provo, he would have to go through the
units and make sure that they were set and aligned and knobs
were where they needed to be and make sure the train was
ready to go.
In fact, there's evidence in the reply brief
submitted to you that Mr. Raab was a conductor on units in
May, this very month, the accident occurred May 31, on at
least I think seven7 occasions he had worked on units that
had at least two 6000 series units in them.

He knew what

these units were, he was familiar with these units and he
could have bumped his head at any of those times under any
circumstances and he could have not bumped his head at this
time just like he avoided it on all prior occasions.
Mr. Thompson talked about Wilson.
Rogers.

Wilson is after

In fact Mr. Thompson affirmatively states as follows

in Rogers and when he said that he means the way that many
courts have misconstrued and followed Rogers.

In that

particular case, however, the plaintiff was injured while
returning from actually repairing the defect.

He never would

have had to be where he was had there not been a defect.
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1 j Raab was not injured while going to or from as we talked
2 j about.
3

The Juno case, plaintiff was pushing a bar to fix a

4 J defective coupler when the bar slipped and he fell.
5

Raab was

not doing anything to fix the dynamic brakes at the time.

He

6 J was simply having to enter into a 6000 series locomotive.
7

Mr. Thompson says that he's stunned that we didn't

8

cite Rogers.

Again, the issue in Rogers of one percent

9

versus sole cause isn't an issue.

At issue is whether there

10

is any cause at all and we submit that there isn't and

11

there's no need to discuss whether 1 or 100 percent is

12

required.

13

too far removed.

14

not been overruled.

15 | Case.

The point is, there's no causation because it's
Rogers simply was not material.

Davis had

That's a United States Supreme Court

Rogers, in fact, relies on Davis and cites it when it

16 | explains that all it was doing was setting the standard that
17 j had always been the standard, was doing nothing new.

Rogers

18 I court didn't think it was doing anything new at all by citing
19

Davis and all those prior cases.

All it thought it was doing

20

was saying no, the defendant doesn't have to be 100 percent.

21

That's all it was saying and that, of course, clearly had

22

been law as stated in Davis and in multiple prior Supreme

23 I Court cases.
24 !
25

So Lang and Reese and all those cases that
understood and properly applied that law as stated in Rogers
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and e Isewhere, cl early are appropriate cases and support this

!

court in understanding that causation is causation and it

j

just isn't causation from this particular dynamic brake
issue •
The Christensen case that Mr. Thompson was so
surprised that we didn' t cite was a statute of limitations
case.

It was an asbestos exposure case and the court on

appea 1 ruled that therei was enough evidence to go back to the
9

jury, that summar y judcfment on statute of limitations wasn't

10

warranted and in the course of doing that talked about Rogers

11

and s tated merely what we've talked about.

12

this statute "The test of a jury case is simply whether the

It said under

13 | proof justified with reason the conclusion that employer
14 | negligence played any part, even the slightest, introducing
15 | the injury or death for which damages are sought" citing
16 j Rogers.

That's the law.

I mean, there's nothing illegal. It

17 j doesn't say causation is gone. It doesn't say that simply by
18 i being injured where, you know, something remotely might be

19 i found to have been broken or defective thereby makes that
20 j i R J ury recoverable, no.

The dynamic brake issue cannot be a

21

basis for liability either under the Locomotive Inspecstion

22

Act or negligence and that's why it' 3< sought in this

23

par ticular motion to have that issue taken compl etely out of

24

the case.

25

THE COURT:

Thank you.
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I believe the answer to the question is in some of
the cases that have been cited by the parties and I note that
the Rogers case does talk about whether the proof justifies
the conclusion that the employer negligence played any part,
even the slightest in producing the injury for which the
damages are sought.

And it goes on to say that the

conclusion may be drawn that the negligence of the employer
played any part at all in the injury or death, that's the
inquiry.

The judges are to fix their sights primarily to

make that appraisal and if that test is made, are bound to
find a case where the jury is made up.

So the test is has

that single inquiry been met?
What we have in this particular case - and I think
the critical thing about this particular case is has the
issue with 506 or 5006 been resolved or not?

I think the

facts, undisputed facts are that that engine had been
removed, it was set aside, there was nothing left to do with
that engine when Mr. Raab was injured.

He left that engine.

He'd gone to the new consist and was checking it out to see
whether or not it was in appropriate condition to move down
the hill.
This is nor the Wilson case because this is not
repairing or going to or from the repair like that case was.
Everything had been finished.

If it had been finished 12

hours before or 10 minutes before, it is still finished and I
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believe there is no connection between the dynamic brake
issue and the injury that Mr. Raab suffered when he was
connecting up the new consist.

I don't believe that there's

any negligence between the two, there's no connection.
just don't accept that argument.

I

Everything was finished

with the 5006, it was set aside.
Now what we have is Mr. Raab doing a new duty and
that is the duty of preparing this new consist to make sure
it's in order before it goes down the hill.

So the

connection with the train at issue, 5006, is over with, we're
onto a new duty and there's no connection between those two
12 i as far as the negligence of the railway.

So I will grant the

Motion for Summary Judgment that the dynamic brake issue is
not relevant to this case and I will give you my decision on
the issue concerning the air conditioning unit after I review
the briefs that we have.

If you'd like to give me those

cases that you cited, Mr. Thompson, on those issues, I'd be
happy to look at them as well.
MR. THOMPSON:

Would Your Honor like to have them

now or may I mail them to you?
THE COURT:

Whichever is more convenient for you.

MR. THOMPSON:

I'd like to mail them if that's

okay.
THE COURT:

Very well, okay.

side know which ones you sent me.

Just let the other

You don't have to send
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them copies.
MR. THOMPSON:

I'm going to carbon copy them as

well so there's no issue.
THE COURT:

Just tell them the name of the cases, I

think that's probably sufficient but if you want to send them
that's also okay.

Then I will review this.

There are two

memos in this file that were filed, one on the 3ra of
December according to the filing here which is Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition of the Federal Locomotive Inspection
Act and the Defendant's Replay Memorandum on the Violation of
the Act.

It seems to me there ought to be another memo in

here someplace.
MR. MCGARVEY:

Your Honor, it may help, we

submitted last week and apparently something happened but we
submitted two binders.

One of the binders contained the

initial motion memorandum, the opposition and the reply.

So

apparently that binder has been —
THE COURT:

I haven't gotten any binders.

MR. MCGARVEY:
THE COURT:

- misdelivered or something.

This is the only one I have and I see

down that there was another memo filed.

We have them all but

like I said, gentlemen, I guess I have to accept some
responsibility, I should have looked at the docket to make
sure everything was here but I just assumed that when I
looked at this file that everything was in it.
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MR. MCGARVEY:

It's my responsibility.

I'm happy

to prepare another binder if that would be convenient.
THE COURT:

Maybe we ought to just have them check

downstairs to see if that binder shows up before you do it
because they're in this file now, I can look in this file and
see it.
MR. MCGARVEY:

Your Honor, would you like me to

prepare an order for the (inaudible)?
THE COURT:

Yes, please prepare an order on it.

MR. MCGARVEY:

Would you like me to include then

the denial of the discovery motions?
THE COURT:

Yes, they're moot.

MR. MCGARVEY:

Mooted.

Thank you.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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Respondent, Utah Railway Company ("URC"), hereby files its opposition in
answer to the Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutor)' Order filed by Petitioner,
Scott Raab. Mr. Raab has expressed an intent to file a second petition for an appeal of
another interlocutory order. To avoid any confusion, this answer addresses Mr. Raab's
first petition that pertains to his claim that an alleged defective dynamic brake on
locomotive unit 5006 caused his injury when he later stood up too soon in the cab of a
completely different, stationary locomotive that was not even coupled to the 5006 unit,
-173

and allegedly bumped his head.
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
The train on which the Petitioner, Scott Raab, was working on May 31. 2002 was a
freight train that was made up of loaded coal cars. A consist (or group) of four
locomotives was pulling that train. It also had five or six helper units that were coupled
in the middle of the train. The helper units assisted the train's ascent from Helper. Utah
to the top of Soldier Summit, where those helper units were uncoupled from the train and
returned to Helper. The conductor. Mr. Raab, and the engineer were the only two crew
members operating that freight train. They were both on the lead locomotive.
Inasmuch as the engineer is required to remain in control of the train from the cab
of the lead locomotive, it was Mr. Raab's responsibility, as the conductor, to leave the
lead locomotive to do anything else that needed to be done. On May 31, 2002, Mr. Raab
in fact was involved in the switching of locomotives at Soldier Summit, including
switching to free the helper units so they could return to Helper before the train proceeded
in the other direction to Provo. He assisted by being on the ground to do the uncoupling
and coupling that was necessary to free the helper units. Mi'. Raab testified that he also
went into many of the other locomotives while assisting with the moving of the
locomotives at Soldier Summit. The 5006 unit was removed from the consist because the
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engineer thought it had a problem with its dynamic brakes.1 Mr. Raab did not know if the
5006 unit was left at Soldier Summit or went back to Helper with the helper units.
On May 31, 2002, after the train had been coupled without the helper units and the
5006 unit, Mr. Raab was performing his expected duties of going into the trailing
locomotive units of the consist of locomotives that had been coupled together at the head
end, in order to make sure the controls were properly positioned. This was necessary to
enable the engineer to control those locomotives from the cab of the leading unit. It was
while Mr. Raab was performing this task, although it could have been while doing any
number of tasks that would have required him to be in a trailing unit, that he stood up too
soon after entering through the cab door. By standing up before he had moved from
beneath the doorway and an air conditioning unit installed on the ceiling just inside the
doorway of a 6000 series locomotive, he bumped his head on the bottom of that air
conditioner. Mr. Raab could have bumped his head on the air conditioner in that unit or
any other such 6000 series unit, or he could have bumped his head while going through
the doorway itself or at other locations within the cab where the available headroom was
lower than his height, at any other time while performing any number of other job duties
that would have required him to go into such locomotives.

l

This later proved out to be untrue or at least unlikely since a subsequent
inspection revealed no problem with these brakes.
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Mr. Raab stood up and bumped his head while the train was stopped, not while it
was braking or stopping. Moreover, at the time he bumped his head, the 5006 unit with
the alleged defective dynamic brake was not even coupled to the train; it had been set out
(detached from the rest of the train), and could not. through any malfunctioning brake,
have caused plaintiff to stand up when he did before moving out from beneath the air
conditioner.
It should be understood that locomotive cabs, by their very nature, are confined in
the amount of available headroom. The doorways require almost all employees to bend
over, or w4duck,*' while entering. Mr. Raab testified that he always ducked when going
through any locomotive cab door. He is over six feet tall. Even inside locomotive cabs,
there are various places where virtually all employees cannot stand fully erect. In the
6000 series locomotives the height of the cab door and other places within the cab range
in height from 5*1.5*' to 5"" 8". The lavatory has only 5* 10.75*' of clearance. At those
locations the clearance is less than the 5*11** of clearance beneath the air conditioners
installed in the 6000 series locomotives.
Mr. Raab's factual theory on causation is not that an alleged defective dynamic
brake on unit 5006 caused him to move unexpectedly or suddenly so as to bump his head.
His theory on causation is that the alleged defective dynamic brake on unit 5006 resulted
in at least a part reason for his performance of his usual and ordinary duties during the
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performance of which he injured himself by standing erect sooner than he should have,
bumping his head in a different locomotive. Mr. Raab seeks to blame his employer for an
alleged condition that caused him in part to have to do work. The district court below
properly dismissed all claims predicated on the alleged defective dynamic brake on the
detached 5006 unit, thereby allowing the case to proceed as to the alleged negligence
pertaining to the existing air conditioner in the 6000 series locomotive in which he was
working, and to Mr. Raab's own negligence in standing fully erect too soon while still
beneath the air conditioner.
RESPONSE TO STANDARD OF REVIEW
In addition to stating the standard of appellate review, Mi*. Raab also states what
he contends to be the law applicable to actions brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act ("FELA"). Mr. Raab's statement is misleading, and, therefore, it is
necessary to clearly summarize what the FELA provides.
Negligence actions under the FELA are similar to common law negligence actions
in that both provide for trial by jury, unless waived. Likewise, both types of negligence
actions require evidence. In fact both require the same standard of evidence sufficient
for the plaintiff to prove all the usual elements of a negligence action by a
"preponderance of the evidence." and not any lesser burden of proof. Finally, FELA and
state law negligence actions differ only in that, under the FELA. the contributorily
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negligent plaintiff can recover even if the railroad employer was as little as 1% negligent;
whereas, under Utah law, the plaintiff has to prove negligence by tortfeasors greater than
the negligence of himself or herself. However, railroad tortfeasors, as with common law
tortfeasors in Utah, are liable only to the extent of their proportionate share of negligence,
unless there is a violation of a safety statute. In that case, the railroad plaintiffs
contributory negligence cannot be considered and the violation is deemed to be per se
negligence.2 Despite this difference in recovery being contingent upon the percentage of
negligence attributed to the defendant, or the violation of a safety statute which is deemed
to be per se negligence without any contributory negligence of the employee, there is no
difference in the legal standard of what constitutes negligence or ''proximate causation"
as elements of the negligence action. The law pertaining to causation in FELA actions is
the same as in state law negligence actions, and is addressed farther in the discussion
below.
NO APPEAL IS WARRANTED AND
NO IMMEDIATE APPEAL IS NECESSARY
I.

Mr. Raab Has No Legal Basis To Overturn The District Court's Ruling.
The district court was correct in its ruling. It is Mi*. Raab who is in error. As a

2

Mr Raab claims the alleged defective dynamic brake is a violation of a safety
statute, relieving him of having to pro\ e actual negligence and of the consequences of his
own nesliaence.
-678

matter of law, the alleged defective brake on the detached, stationary 5006 locomotive
cannot be the legal cause of Mr. Raab bumping his head in a different, stationary
locomotive, when he stood fully erect before he was out from beneath an air conditioner,
during the performance of his duties. No case cited and discussed by Mr. Raab holds
otherwise, including Christiansen v Union Pacific Railroad Co , 2006 UT App 180, 136
P.3d 1266 and Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
However, before responding to Mi*. Raab's discussion of what he contends to be
controlling case law, it is necessary to first point out that summary judgment is properly
(and necessarily) granted where the evidence is not sufficient to prove causation, and the
causation standard that Mr. Raab must meet is the same in FELA cases as in Utah
negligence cases - ''proximate cause."
A.

Summary Judgment Should Be Granted In FELA Cases Where There
Is Insufficient Evidence To Create A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact
As To Whether Causation Can Be Proven By A "Preponderance Of
The Evidence."

Mr. Raab begins by claiming that, in Utah, causation cannot be resolved as a
matter of law. Of course, that proposition is absurd. Causation can be resoh ed as a
matter of law if there is not sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Causation indeed has been resolved as a matter of law, and such
detenninations have been upheld on appeal E g, Mountain West Surgical Center, LLC v.
Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2007 UT 92. 173 P.3d 1276; Tnesault v Greater Salt Lake
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Business Dist., 2005 UT App. 489, % 14, 126 P.3d 781, 785.
Moreover, in FELA cases, as in other negligence cases, there must be sufficient
evidence to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Per singer v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 920 F.2d 1185, 1188 (4th Cir. 1990) ("To recover under the FELA,
a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was
negligent."); Denniston v. Burlington N.} Inc., 726 F.2d 391, 393 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirmed
judgment for employer where jury was instructed that the plaintiff "was required to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the railroad knew or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known of the existence of the condition that rendered the place of work
unsafe*5); Rose v. Atlantic Coast Line RR. Co., 277 F. Supp. 913, 918 (D. S.C. 1967)
("Plaintiff must establish by the preponderance of the evidence that under the
circumstance presented defendant failed to use due care"), hi Utah, there never has been
any question that juries in FELA cases, which after all are civil cases, are given the
traditional preponderance of the evidence instruction similar to what is found at MUJI
2.18.
B.

An FELA Plaintiff Must Prove That The Railroad's Conduct Was A
"Proximate Cause" Of The Plaintiffs Injury.

Plaintiff concedes that legal causation requires evidence to prove the alleged
cause, "in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injur}' and without which the result would not have occurred."' Petition, at 6.
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While acknowledging these elements of causation, Mr. Raab further concedes the fact:
(1) that the alleged defective dynamic brake was on unit 5006. not a 6000 series
locomotive; (2) that unit 5006 was set out and no longer part of the train; (3) that the
train, in any event, was stopped and not in need of braking through the application of any
brakes; (4) that the new consist of locomotives had been coupled together and to the
freight cars; (5) that as part of his normal duties before releasing the train for movement
by the engineer, he went through the new consist to make sure they were ready to be
controlled by the engineer; and (6) that while performing those duties of his employment
he stood fully erect after bending over to enter the cab of a 6000 series locomotive and
stood up too soon while still beneath an air conditioner that did not allow him sufficient
headroom to do so. Thus, contends Mr. Raab, had the dynamic brake on unit 5006 not
been defective, he may not have had to perform the additional duties of his employment
during which he stood up too soon in a stationary 6000 series locomotive and bumped his
head.
Not only did the alleged defective dynamic brake fail to naturally and
continuously, without any intervening cause, cause Mr. Raab to move in a maimer that he
bumped his head. Mr. Raab could have bumped his head on the air conditioner at any
other time and place by simply standing up too soon after bending over to enter through
the door of the cab on any 6000 series locomotive. He could have bumped his head on
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the low doorway or other places in the cab where the headroom was too low for him to
stand fully erect, despite the reason for his entering or being in the locomotive cab. He
could have bumped his head in the lead locomotive of the new consist or the prior consist.
As a matter of law, there can be no legal causation between the alleged defective dynamic
brake and Mi*. Raab's bumped head.
The test for causation in FELA cases is exactly the same as the state law standard
just discussed. FELA plaintiffs do have a lighter burden; they only need to show 1%
employer negligence caused the injury at issue, not that the percentage of the defendant's
negligence is greater than that of the plaintiff. However, there is no lighter burden for the
evidentiary standard of preponderance of the evidence nor the legal standard of proximate
cause as to that, at least. 1% negligence. This is where Mr. Raab erred below and
continues to en* in his Petition.
1.

The United States Supreme Court Has Established That a
Railroad May Only Be Liable Under the FELA If Its Conduct
Was the Proximate Cause In Whole Or in Part Of the
Employee's Injury.

The FELA requires proof that the employer's negligence was a cause "in whole or
in part" of the injury. 45 U.S.C. § 51. This merely means that traditional "contributory"
negligence, that historically operated as a complete defense, and Utah's modified
comparative negligence statute are not applicable. Rather, the FELA provides for pure
comparative negligence so that if railroad negligence is proven to be a 1% ("part") cause
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of the plaintiffs injury and resulting damage, the railroad is liable, but only for 1% of the
plaintiffs damages. See also 45 U.S.C. § 53 ("the fact that the employee may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such
employee"). Thus, at the time the FELA was enacted in the early 1900's, that statute was
an extreme departure from tort law as it then existed. It may not seem so extreme today,
in light of worker's compensation and various types of modified comparative negligence
statutes, but it was then and it greatly liberalized when injured railroad employees could
recover for on-the-job injuries.
The Supreme Court has, since the inception of the FELA, held that the statutory
causation rule is proximate cause: the plaintiff must prove that the railroad's "negligence
was the proximate cause in whole or in part" of the employee's injury. Tennant v. Peoria
& Peking Union Ry. Co.. 321 U.S. 29, 32 (1944) (citation omitted); see also Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 195 (1949) (recognizing proximate cause as the appropriate
standard in FELA suits); Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799, 810 (2007)
(Souter, J., concurring) (recognizing that Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company
did not remove proximate cause from the FELA). Because the statute provides that a
railroad may be liable if the employee's injur}' or death "resulted . . . in part from die
[railroad's] negligence," 45 U.S.C. § 51, the jury may find the railroad liable even if there
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were other causes of the employee's injury or death. However, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the requirement of proximate causation must still be met. The railroad's
conduct must be either "the sole or a contributor)7 proximate cause/5 Coray v. Southern
Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520, 523 (1949). Accordingly, "cto warrant a finding that negligence . .
. is the proximate cause of an injury it must appear that the injury was the natural and
probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act. . ."' Brady v. Southern Ry., 320
U.S. 476, 483 (1943). The Supreme Court has reiterated the federal proximate cause rule
under the FELA in case after case.3
The Supreme Court further elaborated on the federal proximate cause rule in Davis
v Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239 (1923). In that case, which involved a FELA claim based upon
the railroad's violation of the Safety Appliance Act, the Court held that <kan employee
cannot recover5' if the railroad's unlawful conduct *'is not a proximate cause of the

3

See, e g., Lang v New York Cent. R.R., 255 U.S. 455, 461 (1921) (reversing for
lack of evidence of proximate cause); St. Louis -San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mills, 271 U.S.
344, 347 (1926 ) (same); Northwestern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bobo, 290 U.S. 499, 503 (1934)
(same): see also, e.g. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. McWiirter, 229 U.S. 265, 280
(1913): Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U.S. 147. 148 (1924); Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault St.
Marie Ry. Co. v. Goneau, 269 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1926): New York Cent. R.R. v. Ambrose,
280 U.S. 486, 489 (1930): Swinson v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 294
U.S. 529. 531 (1935): Brady v. Terminal R.R. Assn of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10, 15 (1938);
Tiller v Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co, 318 U.S. 54, 67 (1943); Coray, 335 U.S. at 523
(1949); Urie, 337 U.S. at 195; ODonnell v. Elgin Joliet & E Ry. Co . 338 U.S. 384, 390
(1949). Carter v Atlantic & St Andrews Bay Ry Co . 338 U.S. 430. 434-35 (1949):
Brown v Western Ry of Ala . 338 U.S 294.297-98(1949).
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accident which results in his injury, but merely creates an incidental condition or situation
in which the accident, otherwise caused, results in such injury/' Id. at 243 (emphasis
added). On the other hand, the employee may recover if such employer conduct was a a
proximate cause of the accident, resulting in injury to him while in the discharge of his
duty." Id. The United States Supreme Court has never changed this rule of law.
Notwithstanding this overwhelming precedent, and the rule that the Supreme Court
"does not normally overturn, or . . . dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio"
Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000), some lower
courts have held that the Supreme Court silently overruled decades of its prior causation
precedents in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 352 U.S. 500 (1957). See
Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799, 809-810, at n.* (Souter, J. concurring) (discussing circuit
conflict). Those rogue decisions cannot be followed for two reasons. First they are based
on a patent misreading of Rogers. Second, and most fundamentally, the Supreme Court
has held that it has exclusive prerogative to declare its own precedents overruled, and
lower courts must continue to follow those prior precedents even if they believe them to
be inconsistent with later Supreme Court decisions. Rodriguez de Quijas v
Shear son/American Express, Inc . 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
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2.

The Supreme Court's Decision in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company did not Remove Proximate Causation from
the FELA.

Mr. Raab cited to Rogers for his underlying proposition that it is easier to prove
employer liability under the FELA. This Court should not be confused by such a
statement. Rogers merely rejected a particular state common law conception of
"proximate cause55 that required a showing that the railroad's wrongful act was the "sole"
cause of injury. 352 U.S. at 506. In other words, there would be no liability if the
employee also proximately caused his/her injury to any degree (1%). That conception
was contrary to both the plain language of the FELA and prior Supreme Court precedents
on proximate cause, as set forth above. Rogers made clear that in circumstances where
upon the evidence the jury could find either the employee's and the railroad's negligence
or just the railroad's negligence to be the proximate cause of the injury, a prima facie case
was established. As the Sorrell concurrence explained: "Despite some courts5 views to
the contrary. Rogers did not address, much less alter, existing law governing the degree of
causation necessary for redressing negligence as the cause of negligently inflicted harm;
the case merely instructed courts how to proceed when there are multiple cognizable
causes of an injury.55 127 S. Ct. 799, 809-810 (Souter, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
In Rogers, the employee had been burning weeds on a sloping track bed. When a
train passed, it fanned the flames of the fire he had created, and forced the employee to
-I4-
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back onto a culvert. The employee slipped on gravel and fell off the culvert, sustaining
physical injuries. At trial, the employee adduced evidence that the railroad was negligent
in requiring him to work near the tracks where passing trains could fan the flames around
him, and in failing to maintain the surface of the culvert from which he slipped; the
railroad countered with evidence that the employee was negligent in not watching his fire.
352 U.S. at 502-04. The Court expressly stated that, on the evidence presented, the jury
could have found either the employee or the railroad to have been the legal cause of the
injury. Id. at 504.
Even though the jury had found for the plaintiff, the Missouri Supreme Court had
reversed the judgment, in part on the ground that the employee's "conduct was at least as
probable a cause for his mishap as any negligence of the [railroad], and that in such case
there was no case for the jury." Id. at 505. The state court had erroneously ruled that
"there is no jury question in actions under this statute . . . unless the judge can say that the
jury may exclude the idea that his injury was due to causes with which the defendant was
not connected.'5 Id. at 505-06. The Supreme Court in Rogers disapproved the state
court's decision, which improperly invoked "language of proxmiate causation which
makes a jury question dependent upon whether the jury may find that the defendant's
negligence was the sole, efficient, producing cause of injury. " Id. at 506 (emphasis
added). A rule that the railroad's negligence must be the "sole" proximate cause of injury
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is contrary to the statutory directive that renders a railroad liable if its negligence is a
partial cause of the employee's injury. 45 U.S.C. § 51. Rather, where the evidence
suggested multiple causes, the Supreme Court held that "[u]nder this statute the test of a
jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer
negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injuiy or death for which
damages are sought.'' Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506 (emphasis added). If that test is met. "a
case for the jury is made out whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other
probabilities." Id. at 507. The Sorrell concurrence summarized the Rogers holding as
follows:
The notion that proximate cause must be exclusive proximate cause
undermined Congress's chosen scheme of comparative negligence by
effectively reviving the old rule of contributory negligence as barring any
relief, and we held that a FELA plaintiff may recover even when the
defendant's action was a partial cause of injuiy but not the sole one.
Recovery under the statute is possible, we said, even when an employer's
contribution to injuiy was slight in relation to all other legally cognizable
causes.
Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799. 810-11 (Souten J., concurring).
Rogers cannot be read to overrule the federal proximate cause standard that
the Court had established in its prior FELA cases, including Davis. Rogers was
not creating new law at all; it restated settled law under the FELA for cases
involving multiple causes of the injuiy. See Mines v Sweeney. 201 P. 165. 170
(W\o. 1921) ("Under this act the railroad company is liable, if its negligence
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contributes proximately to the injury, no matter how slightly, and no matter how
great may be the negligence of the employee.5").
Indeed, as the Sorrell concurrence noted. ''[t]he absence of any intent to
water down the common law requirement of proximate cause is evident form the
prior cases on which Rogers relied/" Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799, 811 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Far from overruling its FELA proximate cause precedents, the
Rogers Court derived its test of a jury case from those authorities. For example,
Rogers cited Coray, which, as noted above, held that the railroad's negligence
must be either 'the sole or a contributory proximate cause" of the employee's
injury. See Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506, n. 11 (citing Coray, 335 U.S. at 523).
Similarly, Rogers cited Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., which held
that the railroad can only be held liable if "the jury detemiines that the defendant's
breach is 'a contributory proximate cause' of injury." See Rogers, 352 U.S. at 507
n. 13. See also Rogers, 352 U.S. at 508-09 n. 16 (relying on Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54. 67 (1943) (holding that the issue under the FELA
is ''whether the carrier was negligent and whether that negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury"). Finally, it is notable that the Rogers Court, in
stating the test for a jury case, did not quarrel with the proximate cause instructions
given to the jury. Sorrell 111 S. Ct. 799. 811.
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3.

Supreme Court Cases After Rogers v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company Confirm That Proximate Cause
Remains an Element in FELA Actions.

Later Supreme Court cases show that Rogers did not abrogate the longstanding
rule of proximate cause. In Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., the jury had been
instructed that it must find proximate cause, and render a special verdict that "the injuries
to the plaintiff [were] proximately caused by the acts or omissions of the defendant." 372
U.S. 108, 111 (1963) (ellipses omitted) (railroad employee suffered injuries after
allegedly receiving an insect bite along railroad right of way). The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's grant of a judgment as a matter of law to the defendant,
applying the test for review of the sufficiency of the evidence of proximate causation
provided in Tennant, which leaves to the jury the resolution of conflicting inferences of
causation. Id.dX 114-15. Importantly, the Court characterized Rogers as one of the
;%

[l]ater Federal Employers' Liability Act cases involving sufficiency of the evidence on

causation where several explanations are plausible [that] follow the teaching of the
Teimcmt case" (i.e , that plausible inferences of proximate cause are for the jury). Id. at
115-16. In Gallick, there were several competing possible causes of the insect
infestation, unrelated to the railroad, which resulted in injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 112
(possible causes included pollution of the Cuyahogo River by others and ''unsanitary
places situated on property not owned or controlled by the railroad'*).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court, one year after, reaffirmed and applied the rule that
an employer could be liable for a violation of a statutory duty that is 'the proximate cause
of the accident*' in a case under the Jones Act (which incorporates FELA). Kernan v Am.
Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 4265 434 (1958) (quoting Davw, 263 U.S. at 243) (examining
whether a Jones Act plaintiff, like a FELA plaintiff, can recover for injuries caused by his
or her employer's violation of a safety statute). The Court reviewed not only Davis,
which clearly was not overruled by Rogers, but also five other proximate cause
precedents under the FELA, and held that 'the principles governing those cases clearly
should apply here.'" ¥L.ernan, 355 U.S. at 439. There can be no reasonable doubt that
proximate cause is the rule under the FELA.
4.

The Cases Cited By Mr. Raab Support The District Court's
Ruling Which Followed United States Supreme Court Precedent.

Mr Raab relies upon, and cites, Rogers which has been discussed above and
shown to support the district court's ruling. Rogers did not criticize and reject the aspect
of "proximate cause" that requires a plaintiff to show a legal connection between the
defendant's conduct at issue and the plaintiffs injury. The other cases cited by Mr. Raab
cannot alter the rule of law on causation espoused by the United States Supreme Court,
nor do they purport to do so.
In Christiansen v Union Pacific Railroad Co , 2006 UT App 180. 136 P 3d 1266,
which relied on Rogers, the Utah Court of Appeals did not ha\e before it the issue of
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causation. On appeal was the denial of summary judgment for the railroad which the
railroad sought on the basis of the plaintiff having insufficient evidence to prove
negligence. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the plaintiff had to prove the
railroad's negligence, i.e., a breach of the duty to use reasonable care in furnishing a safe
place to work under the circumstances. 2006 UT App 180, «fl 9, 136 P.3d at 1270. The
Court of Appeals also made reference to the fact that in FELA cases the plaintiff is
entitled to trial by jury. 2006 UT App. 1805 \ 105 136 P.3d at 1270. The Court of
Appeals upheld the denial of summary judgment because it uconclude[d] that [the
plaintiff] has provided sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to infer that. .. the
[railroad] failed to prove a safe workplace" which of course meant a "reasonably" safe
workplace in light of the legal standard for negligence previously stated by the court.
2006 UT App 180,1111, 136P.3dat 1271. By acknowledging that evidence sufficient to
prove just 1% negligence is lighter than requiring evidence to prove 51% or more
negligence, this case does not purport to do away with "proximate cause*5 and impose a
lighter standard for proving legal causation in FELA cases.
In fact, Christiansen supports the district court's ruling. As Mr. Raab points out,
where fair-minded jurors cannot honestly differ on the issue of whether employer fault
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played any part in the employee's injury, there is no jury case. Petition, at 8.4 Likewise,
there is no jury case where the evidence cannot lead to any honest difference on the issue
of whether any percentage of employer negligence proximately caused the employee's
injury. Even in FELA cases, the issue of causation should not be required to go to trial
where as a matter of law a reasonable jury cannot find proximate cause by a
preponderance of the evidence. This principle was properly applied by the district court
when it rejected Mr. Raab's theory that the alleged defective dynamic brake on unit 5006
caused his injury when he later bumped his head on the bottom of an air conditioner in a
6000 series locomotive.
Plaintiff also cites Chicago Great Western Railroad Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287
(1925). The issue was not over the sufficiency of the evidence to prove legal causation,
as Mi". Raab erroneously states in his Petition. The issue before the Court was whether a
safety act was applicable. The act at issue provided that cars moved in interstate traffic
were to be equipped with working couplers that did not require men to go between cars to
uncouple the cars. The facts were that a car was being pulled by a chain that required the

4

Mr. Raab cites Harbin v. Burlington N.R. Co., 921 F.2d 129 (7th Cir, 1990), as
support. In Harbin, the Circuit Court found that evidence of locomotives emitting clouds
of exhaust fumes in an area with no ventilation and where the plaintiff was required to
work, coupled with the plaintiff working around excessive soot and debris with
inadequate face masks, was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the railroad's failure to
take available corrective measures and precautions could be some negligence. Id. at 13132. Causation was not at issue.
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plaintiff to go between the cars to disengage the chain, and the plaintiff was injured while
performing that service. The Court held that the safety act applied. Id. at 291-92. The
plaintiff "went into the dangerous place because the equipment of the car which it was
necessary to detach did not meet the statutory requirements especially intended to protect
men in his position/* Id. at 292. This case supports the district court's ruling in the case
at bar, since any statute that prevents defective dynamic brakes on locomotives is not
intended to prevent employees from entering other stationary locomotives that do not
have defective brakes and that are detached from the locomotive with the defective
brakes. If anything, the alleged defective brake merely resulted in Mr. Raab doing
additional physical work than he otherwise may have had to do, during which work he
bumped his head on an air conditioner.
Finally, Mr. Raab cites Wilson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 56 F.3d 1226 (10th
Cir. 1995). This is one of the cases that appears to have erroneously construed Rogers to
take the element of proximate causation out of the FELA. The Wilson court incorrectly
assumed that causation exists if negligence played any part in injuring the plaintiff, rather
than liability exists if negligence proximately caused my part of the plaintiffs injuiy. Id.
at 1230. Consequently, the court failed to analyze the facts under the lens of the proper
proximate cause standard, and held that it was enough that he was injured while returning
from attending to a safety statute violation. Id.
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In the alternative, the Wilson court reasoned that even under the proximate cause
standard, causation could be proven if it was foreseeable that an employee charged with
"repairing"' a safety statute violation must go to and return from the repair site in the dark
on uneven ground where he could step in a rut. Id. Although that too is an unreasonable
stretch of the concept of "'proximate cause'" as being that cause which naturally and
efficiently arose from the condition in need of repair, as opposed to the rut in uneven
ground that could not be seen, it still fails to meet the facts of the case at bar. Mr. Raab
never attempted to repair the alleged defective dynamic brake on unit 5006. He only set
out - or detached - the 5006 unit from the rest of the train. He did not bump his head
while doing that work, or while going to or from the 5006 unit. Only after it had been set
out and a new consist of locomotives were in place, did Mi*. Raab bump his head while
performing duties necessary for the train to be able to proceed to its destination. Mi*.
Raab bumped his head while in a 6000 series locomotive cab he did not have to be in to
repair or set out the 5006 unit and he could have been in for any number of reasons at any
time. It was not reasonably foreseeable that any defective dynamic brake on unit 5006
could lead to Mr. Raab bumping his head in a different locomotive that was at the time
not moving.
The facts are not disputed. The only issue is whether the law allows a jury to find
a legal causal connection between the alleged defective dynamic brake on unit 5006 and

Mr. Raab's injury from having bumped his head in a 6000 series locomotive. There is
nothing for a jury to decide, since under the law discussed above, including all authority
cited by Mr. Raab, there is no legal causation as a matter of law.
II.

The Interlocutory Appeal Mr. Raab Seeks Is Unnecessary And Will Cause
Undue Delay.
Finally, an immediate appeal will not advance the efficient termination of this

litigation, but instead will needlessly delay it First, as just discussed, any appeal would
be a waste of time because Mr. Raab errs in his legal position. Yet even if Mr. Raab
could be correct, which he cannot under the law, it would not require a retrial of any
claim.
The district court's dismissal of Mr. Raab's allegation of a defective dynamic
brake on unit 5006 is not a complete dismissal. Mr. Raab still has a negligence action
regarding the existence of the air conditioner on the 6000 series locomotive. He could
prevail on that claim and on his belief he was not contributorily negligent, rendering the
safety statute violation claim meaningless. Even if he were found at trial to be
contributorily negligent, his full damages still would have been determined before any
reduction for his proportionate share of negligence, and any reduction in recovery for his
contributoiy negligence could be reversed in a subsequent trial of the claimed violation of
a safety statute. If he did not prevail on his negligence claim, he could proceed to trial
after an appeal on his safety statute violation claim without the negligence claim
-24-
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previously tried. There does not have to be any duplication. Thus, an appeal now is not
necessary and will needlessly delay this case.
Alternatively, Mr. Raab contends that even if he fully prevails on Ms negligence
claim without any contributory negligence assessed against him, he may be prejudiced by
having the jury award a lesser amount of damages in a negligence case than it otherwise
would award in a combined negligence and safety statute violation case. Remember that
the statutoiy violation only results in negligence per se; additional or more severe
damages do not exist just because the conduct which caused the damages is deemed by
law to be a statutoiy violation rather than simple negligence. This argument by Mr. Raab
is nothing more than his hope that he can improperly inflame the jury's passions and
prejudices by presenting a statutoiy violation case instead of mere negligence. He does
not want the jury to consider his own negligence. He wants an appeal now so that he can
proceed to trial on the safety statute violation claim without the negligence claim he will
drop before trial. It is not reasonable to expect a jury to base its decision on the amount
of damages on facts that have nothing to do with the actual amount of damages suffered,
but instead on the basis for liability. There is no justifiable reason that compels allowing
an appeal now just to consider whether plaintiff can try the statutoiy violation claim
together with his simple negligence claim or alone. This case should proceed to trial on
his simple negligence claim, and all appealable issues can be considered by this Court
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thereafter as contemplated by the rules of procedure.
CONCLUSION
There is no reason for an appeal at all, and certainly no reason for an immediate
appeal at this time. The district court's ruling is consistent with controlling authority, and
even this court's prior decision in Christiansen. An interlocutory appeal only will delay
the trial on the negligence claim that will still need to be tried regardless of any decision
on appeal. Also, a trial of the negligence claim could lead to other issues that would
require another appeal. An appeal now is not only unnecessary but it could result in piece
meal appeals and resulting delay. Therefore, Mr. Raab's Petition should be denied, and
URC respectfully requests that it be denied.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2008.
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C.

D
\ J
By ( omx\

(j

Casey K. IV^Garvey
|
Attorneys for Defendant, Utah Railway Company
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT RAAB,
MINUTE ENTRY
Plaintiff,
Case No. 050 908 773
vs.
Judge. LA. DEVER
UTAH RAILWAY COMPANY,
Defendant.
This matter before the Court on defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment. The plaintiff was represented by Stephen Thompson and the defendant was
represented Scott Savage and Casey McGarvey. The motion contained two aspects:
1. Was there liability based upon the alleged failure of the dynamic brake on
locomotive UR 5006
2 Was there a violation of the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act.
At the hearing on December 11, 2007, the Court ruled that the alleged failure of
the dynamic brake was not relevant to the issue of the defendant's potential liability to
the plaintiff for injuries incurred while in the cab of a different locomotive. The Court
took under advisement the second aspect.
After considering the briefs and arguments of the parties, the Court notes the
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following:
1. The Federal Locomotive Inspection Act (FLIA) requires that locomotives and
their parts and appurtenances be "in proper condition and safe to operate without
unnecessary danger of personal injury." 49 U.S.C. §20701.
2. 49 CFR § 229.45 states that "[a]ll systems and components on a locomotive
shall be free of conditions that endanger the safety of the crew . . .,!
3. There is no evidence that the FLIA or any regulation specifically mentions air
conditioners or minimum cab ceiling clearances.
4. There is no evidence that the air conditioner in the subject locomotive was
malfunctioning, defective or broken as the time the plaintiff bumped into it.
5. As pointed out in the defendant's memorandum the plaintiff does not have to
show the existence of a defects to find a violation of the Act but he does need to show
that his injury was a proximate result of the failure of the part in question (AC Unit) to
perform properly. In this particular case, the plaintiff alleges that the AC Unit was hung
too low, reducing the head clearance. There is no allegation that there was a defect in
the functioning of the unit.
6. The cases cited by the plaintiff: Lilly v. Grand Trunk W.R.Co. and Delevie v.
Reading Co. can be distinguished from this case. Lilly involved a fall from the top of an
ice covered tender and Delevie involved a gearbox that impeded the plaintiff's access to
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a safety handrail. The Utah case of Ehalt v. McCarthy, 138 P.2d 646 (Utah 1943)!which
like the cases cited by the plaintiff addressed the Boiler Inspection Act (the predecessor
of FLIA), appears more on point. In Ehalt the Utah Supreme Court, in distinguishing the
case from Lilly, pointed out that
A danger created by the non-attention or neglect incident
to operation which does not produce an engine defective
in itself constitutes the basis for an action, not under the
Boiler Inspection Act, but under other Sections of Title 45.
At. 646.
7. The undisputed facts in this case establish that this is a case of non-attention
incident to operation and therefore appropriate for summary judgment denying liability
under FLIA.
8. The evidence of the removal of the air conditioning units is inadmissable to
show negligence or prove liability under Rule 407 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
However, this prohibition is subject to being set aside if the facts of the case establish
that the use is for impeachment.
Counsel for the defendant to draft the appropriate Order.
Dated this 11 th day of February, 2008.

BY THE COURT

3

102

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry was
mailed this _jj

day of February, 2008, to the following:

E. Scott Savage
Casey K. McGarvey
Susan E. Baird
BERMAN & SAVAGE
170 South Main St, Ste 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Stephen C. Thompson
KIRKLIN FOLAWN, LLP
522 SW 5th Ave, Ste 1100
Portland, OR 97204
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